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This analysis is a comparison o f the utilization rates of registered nurses and licensed
practical nurses at for-profit, non-profit and government operated nursing homes in
Montana from 1992-1998. It also compares output levels at for-profit and chain nursing
homes to non-profit and government nursing homes. The analysis was conducted by
estimating production functions using ordinary least squares estimation on data collected
by the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services.
Statistical evidence was found indicating over-utilization of licensed practical nurses at
government nursing homes and over-utilization of registered nurses at for-profit and non
profit nursing homes. Though statistically significant, the impact on output was
negligible. The results indicate that output could only be improved by between 0.5 and 1
patient day per year per thousand dollars allocated to these two production inputs.
The comparison o f output levels revealed that for-profit nursing homes and those
operating as part of a chain produced fewer patient days per year than non-profit or
government nursing homes with the same level o f inputs employed. For-profit and chain
nursing homes produced around 5% less output than the non-profit or government
nursing homes. The source of this differential was the utilization rate of capital, or
licensed nursing home beds. Non-profit and government nursing homes were operating
closer to capacity and produced more patient days per licensed bed than for-profit nursing
homes in Montana from 1992-1998.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nursing homes provide an important function in our society and have become
increasingly more prominent in recent history. The quality of care provided by nursing
homes has been the primary concern since the start of the nursing home boom in the late
1960's. A large portion of the research and policy making regarding nursing homes has
focused on the quality of care they provide. As quality has improved over time, demand
for nursing home care has grown along with the cost of providing care and the price that
patients must pay. The general aging of the population is generating a large group of
people for whom care will be required. Dual income households and working single
heads of household have been increasing which eliminates one of the alternatives to
nursing home care, family. For the aged population who are not healthy enough to care
for themselves, but whose health condition does not require the level of care provided in a
nursing home, the elderly care industry has expanded to include assisted living facilities,
retirement homes and hospice care. These alternatives have eased the burden on nursing
homes, but the need for nursing care is still growing along with the elderly population.
The supply of nursing home care depends on the number of nursing homes and
the ability of nursing homes to utilize production inputs efficiently. Studies of physician
care have demonstrated that an increase in efficiency can improve output substantially
without increasing costs. The purpose o f this analysis is to see if that is the case for the
nursing home industry in Montana. The results indicate that while inefficiencies could be
identified, the impact of the inefficiencies was not as substantial as those found in the
studies of physician care. It found, however, that the type of ownership: for-profit, non
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profit or government, can affect the level of output given the same employment levels of
each input. The results of this paper reveal that the nursing home industry in Montana
utilized the primary labor inputs, registered nurses and licensed practical nurses,
efficiently over the period 1992-1998 and that for-profit and chain nursing homes
produced lower levels of output given the same input levels.
This analysis is a look at the supply side of the nursing home industry. Previous
research on the nursing home industry has focussed on either the demand for nursing
home care or the quality of care at nursing homes. This work should prove useful to
policy makers in Montana because the data used for this analysis offer a recent and
relatively complete view of the nursing homes in Montana.
The State of Montana has a minimum staffing requirement in order for a nursing
home to be licensed as a nursing facility. Sufficient staff for licensure, which is required
in order to receive Medicaid reimbursement, includes one licensed nurse to act as the
director o f nursing, one licensed nurse to act as the charge nurse for each shift and one 8hour shift, 7 days per week for a registered nurse. The regulation allows for overlap of
the charge nurse and the director of nursing for smaller nursing homes but does not
differentiate based on size for any other reasons without certain exceptions, such as the
availability of a physician-on-call. The total nursing requirement amounts to 56 hours of
registered nurses and 208 hours of licensed nurses per week. Staffing regulations are not
a source o f inefficiency based on the results of this analysis.
Montana requires a certificate of need be granted in order for new nursing home
beds to be added to an area. Certificate o f need regulations limit the ability o f nursing
homes to make capital investments to expand production and promotes the over-
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Utilization of other inputs such as labor. These regulations are a possible source o f the
inefficiency causing the lower production levels at for-profit and chain nursing homes in
Montana.
This analysis starts with a summary of previous works on related topics. The first
set of works reviewed describe the factors related to the demand for nursing home care
which help to establish a need for the current study. The second set presents a list of
factors related to the quality of care at nursing homes. These analyses show the
subjective nature o f quality measurements. They also show concern regarding the effect
of ownership type and involvement with a chain on the nursing home industry. The third
and final pair of works were used as a framework for this analysis. They analyzed
efficiency using production functions for physicians.
The model was developed using the ideas presented in the literature combined
with basic economic theory and observation of the data. A production function was used
to describe the relationship between the factors o f production and output in patient days.
The primary factors of production were registered nurse (RN) hours, licensed practical
nurse (LPN) hours, other labor hours and licensed beds. Indicators were added to the
model to isolate the effects of different types of ownership and affiliation with a chain on
output and efficiency.
The data were summarized prior to the estimation of the model. The data used for
estimation of the model came fi-om the Montana Department of Public Health and Human
Services Annual Long-Term Care Survey. Patient days and each of the inputs used in the
production function were reported each year fi'om 1992-1998 for all o f the nursing homes
in the state. The data summary looks at the distribution o f each o f the variables included
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in the analysis across the different ownership types and across the years for which the
data were available. A brief summary of the changes in elderly population of the state
was also included to acknowledge the probability of an increase in demand for nursing
home care. Data from the U. S. Census Bureau were used for the population summaiy.
The estimation o f the model follows the summary of data and starts with the
simplest form of the production function. The model was estimated separately on data for
the entire period and for 1997-1998 because some variables were not recorded for the
entire time period. The production function was found to adequately describe the
relationship between the factors of production and patient days and then expanded to
include the indicators for ownership type. Many of the variables lost statistical
significance when the indicators were introduced, but enough remained statistically
significant for the analysis o f efficiency to proceed.
Marginal products and relative efficiency ratios were calculated using the results
of the production fimction estimation with ownership indicators. Moderate inefficiencies
were identified for government nursing homes and for the other types combined. The
magnitude of the inefficiencies was less than one patient day of output per thousand
dollars and was not determined to be large enough to warrant a policy change regarding
employment requirements in nursing homes.
For-profit nursing homes were found to produce a significantly lower level of
output than other types o f nursing homes with the same level of inputs in an estimation of
the production function with an indicator for for-profit status only. The same was true for
nursing homes that were affiliated with a chain. The conclusion based on these results
and a comparison o f the calculated marginal products is that the lower output levels are
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the result of an inefficient mix of labor and capital at for-profit and chain nursing homes.
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Chapter 2: Market for Nursing Home Care
Section 1: The Demand for Nursing Home Care
A number o f factors have been presented in the literature to explain the increase in
demand for nursing home care in the United States over the last half of the 20“*Century.
These factors include the availability of Medicare and Medicaid funding, the increased
participation of women in the labor force and the general aging of the population which
has arisen from low birth rates and increased life expectancy. Research involving the
effects of these factors on demand for nursing home care will be discussed in this section.
Titles XVni and XIX were added to the Social Security act in 1965 providing
federally funded health insurance for elderly and low income people in the United States.
Medicare was established by Title XVIU as a universal health insurance plan for the
elderly, permanently disabled and those with end-stage renal disease requiring kidney
dialysis or transplant. The Medicare program is uniform across all states because it is
operated and financed solely by the federal government. Medicaid was established by
Title XIX as a health insurance plan for low income people, funded by both federal and
state money. Medicaid programs operate according to state regulations that must comply
with a basic federal outline. The states then receive a subsidy from the federal
government to fund the program. The amount of money the federal government
contributes relative to the state contribution depends on the per capita income in the state.
A larger portion of Medicaid expenses are paid by the federal government in states with a
lower per capita income, such as Montana.
Medicare and Medicaid have had vastly different impacts on the demand for
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nursing home care. In general, Medicare does not pay for long term nursing home care
and Medicaid will pay indefinitely for qualified individuals who require long term
nursing home care. Medicaid pays according to the reimbursement plan designed by the
state. For those who qualify for the Medicaid program, the price for long term care is
effectively zero which leads to an increase in the quantity of nursing home services
demanded, ceteris parabis. We could also consider this an increase in demand due to an
increase in the population o f people who can afford the services.
Medicaid has had a much larger impact on the demand for nursing home care than
Medicare, but Medicare is not without influence. Medicare has historically paid for short
term care in nursing homes for people with the ability to recover from their illness.
Currently, Medicare will pay for the first 20 days of nursing home care and an additional
80 days if the patient pays a $67.50 deductible. This has the effect of increasing the
demand for short term services provided by nursing homes. Other medical services
Medicare will pay for, such as home care for the aged and disabled, are substitutes for
nursing home care and have the opposite effect on the demand for nursing home care.
However, recent changes in Medicare which limit spending on home care have reduced
the demand for this alternative, thus increasing the demand for nursing homes as well as
hospital services. According to an article in the New York Times published April 21,
2000 :
Federal payments to provide home health care for the elderly have plummeted
in the last two years, forcing many Medicare patients to spend more time in
hospitals and nursing hom es,... New government data, compiled by the
Congressional Budget Office, show that Medicare spending on home health
care dropped 45 percent in the last two fiscal years —to $9.7 billion in 1999,
from $14.9 billion in 1998 and $17.5 billion in 1997. The sharp decline in
spending stems from changes Congress adopted in 1997 to slow the growth of
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Medicare.’
Not everyone who can afford nursing home care, with or without Medicare and Medicaid,
will require it and so we must consider other factors affecting the demand for nursing
home care.
Chiswick published his results on the factors affecting the demand for nursing
home care in 1976. He used national data from the Statistical Abstract of United States
(1974) and the National Center for Health Statistics to show the trend toward increased
utilization of nursing homes, prior to and after the adoption of Medicaid. His paper
contends that the 67% increase in nursing home residents per thousand people over age
65 between 1963 and 1973 can be adequately explained by demand shift variables other
than the introduction o f Medicaid. He approached the estimation of demand for nursing
home care from two separate directions; first, he did a cross-sectional analysis using data
for 201 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) in 1967, and, second, he did a
time-series analysis using national data from 1963 to 1973.
The cross-sectional analysis measured the effects of price and several
demographic variables on the number of nursing home residents per 1,000 elderly
(defined as those over the age of 65). The data for the dependent variable, number of
residents per 1,000 elderly, came from the Master Facility Inventory (1967) of the
National Center for Health Statistics. The demographic variables used as determinants
were median family income, labor force participation rate of married women, the percent
of elderly who were female, the percent elderly between 70 and 74 years of age, the
percent elderly between 75 and 84, the percent elderly over 85 and the mortality rate for
'Robert Pear, “Medicare Spending for Care at Home Plunges”, The New York Times', April 21, 2000.
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the elderly in the SMSA. The demographic variables all came from the 1970 Census of
Population except for the mortality rate which was defined as the age-adjusted death rate
for persons aged 65 to 85 as reported in Vital Statistics of the United States (1960).
Median family income was the median family income for the SMSA in 1969. The labor
force participation rate o f married women was the proportion o f married women aged 25
to 64 who were in the labor force during the survey. The age-sex distributions were the
simple counts for SMSA’s taken from the Census. He also included indicators for
smaller SMSA’s (under 250,000) and whether or not the state had implemented Medicaid
as of January 1,1967.
Chiswick reported results using three different estimations o f price in the same
model. The first estimate of price was the average modal monthly charge per resident in
nursing homes in each state in 1968. The data was not available by SMSA and so the
statewide value was assigned to each SMSA within the state. The data came from
Charges fo r Care in Nursing Homes: United States April-September 1968, published by
the National Center for Health Statistics in May 1972.
The second estimate o f price was the predicted values from an estimated price
equation with observed statewide price as the dependent variable. Median earnings for
women who worked a full year in 1969 as either an RN, nursing aide, orderly, attendant
or in a cleaning service, the number of physicians per capita, and an indicator for smaller
SMSA’s were the independent variables. The wage variables came from the 1970 Census
of Population. The data on per capita physicians came from a book by J. N. Haug and G.
A. Roback, Distribution o f Physicians, Hospitals and Hospital Beds in the U.S.-I967 by
Region, State, County and Metropolitan Area. Median earnings for women in the various
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occupations served as the labor cost component o f the price equation. The per capita
number of physicians played the role of entrepreneurial talent because he assumed that a
substantial number of private nursing homes were run by physicians. The idea was that in
areas with more physicians per capita they would have more time to devote to the
operation of nursing homes, thus lowering the cost of entrepreneurial talent and the price
o f nursing home care. The small SMSA indicator was included because the data on
median earnings was not available for the smaller areas and he assigned them the value of
an adjacent or nearby larger SMSA. The wages were assumed to be in the same range
because of the mobility of the workers.
The third estimate of price was a variation of the second with a control for quality
o f care. He used the number of employees per 1,000 nursing home residents in 1967 as
the proxy for quality of care. The data for this variable came from Nursing Homes: A
County and Metropolitan Area Data Book. Chiswick expressed concern about the ability
o f this variable to approximate quality because it is “crude” and “questionable”.
It is a crude measure of quality of care and case mix since it reflects labor
inputs, not the service output. It is a questionable measure since the
denominator is the number of residents, which may not be determined
independently o f price.^
Regardless of his misgivings about the measure, he saw the need to include an
approximation of quality o f care in his model.
Chiswick used the same basic model for both the cross sectional and time series
estimations o f demand. He hypothesized a negative coefficient for price according to the
law of demand and a positive coefficient on median family income, making it a normal
good. He predicted demand for nursing home care would increase with income because
^Chiswick 1976, page 299.
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nursing homes likely provide a higher quality o f person care and companionship than the
aged might have access to otherwise. The percent o f married women in the labor force
was hypothesized to have a positive relationship with demand for nursing home services
because they are the most likely family alternative for elderly parents.
Since aged women are generally in better health than aged men, he predicted a
negative relationship between the percent over 65 who are female and the demand for
nursing home services. In contrast, the older the aged population, the more likely they are
to be in poor health and require nursing home services. That is why he hypothesized
positive coefficients for the percent of the elderly between the ages of 70-74, 75-84, and
over 85. The death rate was also expected to have a positive sign because it reflects
poorer general health conditions.
The cross sectional analysis used data during the transitional period after the
enactment of Titles XVHI and XIX o f the Social Security Act and before the
implementation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs by all o f the states. The time
series analysis used national data fi-om before to after all states, except Arizona, had
implemented their Medicaid programs. The Medicaid indicator variable was expected to
have a positive coefficient in both cases because Medicaid would effectively lower the
price to consumers. In the cross sectional analysis he offered the alternative explanation
that the states with higher demand for nursing home services were the first to implement
the program. In that case the positive coefficient would reflect previously existing high
demand in those states and not an increase in demand because of Medicaid.
All of the variables in Chiswick’s reported regression results had the predicted
signs. They were also statistically significant with the exception o f the Medicaid

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

P a g e 12

indicator and the small SMSA indicator in the cross sectional analysis. Price had a large
impact on the quantity demanded. Using the third o f his price variables he estimated an
own price elasticity o f -2.3, meaning the utilization rate of nursing homes decreases by
2.3% with a 1% increase in price. He calculated a positive income elasticity of between
0.6 and 0.9. The labor force participation rate had a positive partial effect on the demand
for nursing home services of about 1.4% increased utilization corresponding to a 1%
increase in the participation rate. The demand for nursing home services was shown to
increase with the age and death rate of the elderly population and decrease with higher
proportions of females. The Medicaid indicator was positive, but statistically not
significantly different from zero.
The main conclusion o f the Chiswick paper is that the increase in demand for
nursing home services over the time period from 1963 to 1973 and between SMSA’s in
1965 and 1967 could be explained by factors other than the introduction of Medicaid.
The factors he believed responsible were changes in real income, female labor force
participation, and the demographic composition of the aged.
Lamberton, Ellingson, and Spear set out to explain the demand for long term care
services in a more recent paper published in 1986. They used data from the 1970 and
1980 Census of Population combined with data collected from 112 skilled and
intermediate care nursing facilities by the South Dakota Division of Social Services,
Department o f Auditing and Contracting in 1980. The unit of observation in the study
was a nursing home. The county level data taken from the 1980 and 1970 Census were
applied to each facility in the county. The dependent variables for the two estimated
demand schedules were private and Medicaid patient days per 1,000 elderly in the county.
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These were called the private patient utilization rate and Medicaid patient utilization rate.
They used ordinary least squares regressions to estimate demand schedules for the private
utilization rate and Medicaid utilization rate separately.
Lamberton, et al. proposed a list of “need” variables as well as economic
variables to explain the observed variation in demand across the state. The “need”
variables referred to the age, health status and availability of family support for the
elderly population in the county.
A high proportion of “old elderly” and poorer general health imply a greater need
for nursing home services. Lamberton, et al. included the same age-dependent measures
as Chiswick; the proportion o f the elderly in the county who were ages 70-74, 75-84, and
85 or older. The data came from the 1980 Census.
The three measures of health status were the number of elderly patient days in
hospitals per 1,000 elderly population, the percent of the county listed as disabled and the
percent o f women over the age of 15 in the labor force. The utilization of hospitals by the
elderly and the percent of the county population listed as disabled are fairly straight
forward measures o f health status. Lamberton, et al. consider the labor force participation
rate of women to be a health related variable because it is a proxy for “the physical
condition of adult women.” The effect of female labor participation on the opportunity
cost o f home health care and on the economic climate o f the area are also noted, but only
in brief and not in the general conclusions. Each o f these proxies for the health status in
the county were expected to have a direct relationship to the demand for nursing home
services. The data for variables related to health status were all calculated from data in
the 1980 Census.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

P a g e 14

The availability of family support was measured by the percent of the population
o f the county classified as rural, the percentage change in population for the county from
1970 to 1980 and the proportion of the county that was widowed females or widowed
males. Increased family support was expected to have an inverse relationship to demand
for nursing home services. An increase in the percent of the county classified as rural
was considered to be a decrease in the availability o f family support. The change in
population was expected to have a negative relationship with demand. Widows and
widowers were thought to be more likely to live with children and so the variables for the
proportion of female and male widowed are expected to have an inverse relationship with
the demand for nursing home care. The percent of the population considered rural and
the proportion of female and male widows in the population came from the 1980 Census
and the change in population was calculated by comparing the 1970 and 1980 Census.
The economic variables included in the analysis by Lamberton, et al. were price,
income and the availability o f substitutes. The price was the daily price charged to
private patients observed in the data collected for the 112 facilities in South Dakota.
Price was expected to be inversely related to the quantity of nursing home services
demanded for private patients and unrelated to demand for Medicaid patients.
Income was measured by the total old age survivors and disability insurance
payments received in the county standardized by the number of elderly. They also
included a wealth variable equal to the per capita value of farm land and buildings to
approximate net worth, property income and cash gifts from relatives. They expected
demand by private patients to increase with income and demand by Medicaid patients to
be unrelated to income because they must have virtually no income in order to qualify for
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Medicaid.
Lamberton, et al. used the number of physicians per 1,000 population in the
county and the number o f home health visits in the county during the first 6 months of
1980 to measure the availability of substitutes for nursing home care. These were
considered substitutes because they would presumably lower the cost of home care. The
data came from the 1980 Census. An inverse relationship was expected to be observed
between these variables and the demand for nursing home services.
Lamberton, et al. reported results from two regressions for private patients; the
full model and one excluding three variables with very low t-statistics. The three
variables excluded from the second regression were the percent aged 70-74, the
proportion of widowed males and the percent of the county classified as rural. The
Readjusted from the regressions indicated that the selected variables explained over half of
the variation in demand for private patients. The results revealed the expected inverse
relationship between price and the quantity of nursing home services demanded. The
calculated price elasticity of demand was -0.76, making nursing home care price inelastic
in the short run. This means that a 10% increase in the price of nursing home care would
lead to a 7.6% decrease in the quantity of nursing home care demanded. The income
elasticity calculated using the income variable based on transfer payments was 1.07,
meaning a 10% increase in income from old age survivors and disability insurance
payments corresponds to a 10.7% increase in the quantity of nursing home care
demanded. That is much higher than the income elasticity calculated using wealth, 0.40,
which is interpreted as a 4% increase in the quantity o f nursing home care demanded
given a 10% increase in the per capita value of farm land and buildings. Both indicate a
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direct relationship with the demand for nursing home care, but it is more responsive to
income from transfer payments than overall wealth. They did not report the elasticity of
substitution based on the per capita number of physicians or home health visits, but both
were negative and statistically significant, as expected.
Health related need variables in the private patient regression were all statistically
significant and had the expected sign, including the labor force participation rate of
women which was negatively related to demand. Demand for nursing home services was
found to increase along with the percent disabled and hospital use and decreased when
the percent o f females in the labor force increased. The need variables related to the age
of the elderly population had mixed results. The percent in the age group 70-74 was not
statistically significant. The coefficient was negative for the percent in the age group 7584 and positive for the percent 85 and over. The percent change in total county
population had a negative and statistically significant relationship to the quantity
demanded.
There were three regressions estimated for Medicaid patients by Lamberton, et al.
The first included the measures for price, income and wealth which were not expected to
be related to demand for this group of patients. The coefficients on price, income and
wealth were not statistically significant and were excluded from the second and third
regressions on which they based their results. The second regression included all of the
variables except for price, income and wealth and the third excluded these plus home
health visits and the percent over 85 years old because the t-statistics for these variables
was below 1.0. The only other variables that changed from the private patient model
were the 70-74 age group and the percent rural population, both of which became
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Statistically significant with a positive sign. The regressions explained less than half of
the variation in demand according to the ReadjustedThe analysis by Lamberton, et al. shows that the demand for nursing home care is
price inelastic and income elastic for private patients, and that price and income are
unrelated to utilization for Medicaid patients. The fact that price and income had no
impact on the demand for nursing home care by Medicaid patients in the analysis by
Lamberton, et al. implies that the Medicaid program has effectively lowered the price in
the aggregate and thereby increased the demand for nursing home care. The summary
statistics showed utilization for private patients ranging from 26 to 1,857 with a mean of
517 patient days per 1,000 elderly. For Medicaid patients it was much higher, 45 to 5,000
with a mean of 748 patient days per 1,000 elderly. Some demographic variables, such as
age distribution of the elderly and the percent of the population that is rural, were shown
to effect demand for nursing home care differently for private patients than Medicaid
patients. The availability of physician services and home health care seem to influence
demand for nursing home care for all patients by acting as substitutes.
The two studies by Chiswick and Lamberton, et al. present a fairly short list of
factors influencing the demand for nursing home care. For some o f these factors,
particularly the participation o f adult women in the labor force and the per capita number
of physicians in an area, the results are conflicting and no conclusions can be drawn based
on these two works. Other factors had a similar impact in each analysis. Both of these
papers concluded that rising incomes and an aging population tend to increase the
demand for nursing home services. The general rhetoric, as indicated by the article fi-om
the New York Times, is that demand for nursing home care is expected to continue to rise
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in the near future. Government expenditures in this industry are clearly a factor in the
increased utilization, but government regulation to improve the quality of care provided
by nursing homes might also have increased private patients willingness to utilize nursing
home services. The next section will be devoted to the literature describing the factors
which influence the quality of care in nursing homes.
Section 2: Quality of Nursing Home Care
A large portion of the research done on the long term care industry focuses on the
quality of care. Nursing homes provide more than just medical care for their patients.
They are also responsible for the social environment in which the patients must live. That
fact contributes to the difficulty in analyzing the level of quality at a facility because there
are more than just health outcomes to consider. Kart and Manard expressed the elusive
nature of the measurement of quality of care in the introduction to their paper published
in 1976.
Clearly a dirty, crowded, understaffed nursing home in which old people live
unhappily and die rapidly is a bad institution. But what is a good one?
Should quality be measured in terms of resident satisfaction or professional
nursing care? Given limited resources, is it more important to spend money
on gardeners, interior design, janitorial services, and food quality, or on
abundance of aides, orderlies, and health professionals? Obviously, no one
type o f facility will be best for all types of people.^
Kart and Manard did not provide any analysis of their own. Instead they summarized the
major characteristics used by others in the literature to measure quality of care in old age
institutions. The factors they list as being related to quality are ownership, size,
socioeconomic status, social integration, and professionalism. One might hypothesize
that the same factors contribute to the quality o f many types of institutions other than long
’Kart and Manard 1976, page 250.
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term care including higher education, hospitals, penal and mental institutions. Of these
factors, ownership, size and professionalism have the most direct policy implications.
Holmberg and Anderson conducted the first formal research into the difference in
quality of care at proprietary, or for-profit, and nonproprietary, or non-profit, nursing
homes and presented the results in a paper published in 1968. The data came from a
study done by the Division o f Medical Care Administration of the Public Health Service
o f Minnesota in 1966 designed to find out why Minnesota had a larger proportion of
nonproprietary homes than the national average. The study consisted of a stratified
random sample o f 118 homes providing skilled and intermediate nursing care in
Minnesota. Interviewers collected data on physical facilities, staff, program, patient
characteristics and cost in telephone interviews with the administrator or “person in
charge”.
Holmberg and Anderson used analysis of variance and stepwise regression to
estimate the difference in mean values between proprietary and nonproprietary homes for
111 different factors reported in the survey. The controls they included in the model were
urban or rural location and whether or not the nursing home was part of a hospital. They
found a significant difference between proprietary and nonproprietary homes for only 12
o f these factors.
The significant differences Holmberg and Anderson found with respect to
physical facilities indicated that nonproprietary homes were generally larger than
proprietary ones. Nonproprietary homes had an average o f 73 nursing care beds
compared with 51 at proprietary homes. Nonproprietary homes averaged 72 boarding
care beds and proprietary homes averaged only 1. Nonproprietary homes had an average
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o f 2.32 floors and 0.97 elevators compared with 1.63 floors and 0.10 elevators at
proprietary homes. None of these factors were considered by the authors to be inherently
related to the quality of care.
Holmberg and Anderson found a significant difference in the number of single
occupancy rooms and also in the number of rooms housing five or more patients.
Nonproprietary homes were higher in both of these factors with an average of 16.19
single rooms and 2.98 five-or-more rooms. Proprietary homes averaged 2.39 single
rooms and 0.37 five-or-more rooms. They mention these as possible indicators o f patient
comfort, but the numbers were inconclusive as to which type of facility is more crowded.
The overall number of patients to rooms was not significantly different for the two types
of homes.
The staffing differences which Holmberg and Anderson found to be statistically
significant were physician hours per week per patient and administrative hours per week
per patient. The difference in physician hours per week was statistically significant, but
the actual difference was small. Nonproprietary homes had an average of 0.07 physician
hours per week per patient and proprietary homes averaged 0.04. The difference of 0.03
corresponds to less than 2 minutes per week per patient and was not considered by the
authors to be a possible source of quality differential. The difference in the average
number o f administrative hours per week per patient, 1.08 for proprietary and 0.68 for
nonproprietary, was also not mentioned as a possible difference in the quality of care.
The program variables evaluated by Holmberg and Anderson were in regards to
the "provision of opportunities for psychosocial maintenance and rehabilitation". The
two values with statistically significant differences were the percent of patients
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participating in holiday celebrations and the percent of patients making purchases at
stores which were provided for them. Proprietary homes had more patients involved in
holiday celebrations and nonproprietary homes had more patients making purchases at the
selected stores.
Holmberg and Anderson compared 54 patient characteristics describing age, sex,
race, socioeconomic status and health status for the residents of the nursing homes in the
data. The only statistically significant differences indicated that proprietary homes cared
for a larger percentage of "confused" patients and nonproprietary homes had a larger
percentage o f patients who were "always aware".
Holmberg and Anderson concluded that there was not much difference between
proprietaiy and nonproprietary institutions. They further concluded that the quality of
care was not affected by the type o f ownership. This paper may have provided a clearer
picture of the relationship between ownership and quality of care if they had presented a
model using only the factors they considered to have explanatory power for quality of
care. The line-by-line comparison provided a good picture o f the lack of structural
differences, but the implications of each item on quality of care was largely left to the
discretion of the reader.
Levey, Ruchlin, Stotsky, Kinloch, and Oppenheim studied the interrelationships
o f cost, ownership and quality of care at nursing homes in their work published in 1973.
They analyzed a sample of 129 o f the 690 licensed nursing homes in Massachusetts in
operation in the fall o f 1969. The 129 were selected from a larger sample of 175 for
which data were collected by the Rate-Setting Commission o f the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and the Division o f Medical Care of the Massachusetts Department of
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Public Health. The 129 facilities had the appropriate data for their analysis in both 1965
and 1969 and were shown to be a representative sample of the nursing home industry for
both 1965 and 1969 with regard to size, ownership, and regional location.
The proxy measure for quality of care developed by Levey, et al. consisted of nine
items for which reliable information was available. The list o f items was selected by a
group o f medical care consultants and state licensing officials and weighted according to
the recommendations of three consultants based upon the previous studies of the
Department o f Public Health. The nine items in the index were nursing service, dietary
services, restorative services, patient activities, physical plant, doctor's order book,
nursing kardex, patient records and personal care. Each item had a list of criteria which
must be met. The nursing homes received a numerical value of 1 or 0 for each item
corresponding to whether or not the criteria had been met and then the weighted total of
all items was used as the quality "score" for a facility. The possible values for this proxy
measure of quality were zero, for facilities that met none of the criteria, to

1 0 0

for

facilities that met all of the criteria for each item.
Nursing services had the most weight in the index used by Levey, et al. It was
made up o f two components worth 20 points apiece. The first was the number of
uncovered shifts. Nursing homes could allow one evening shift (3-11pm) and one night
shift ( 1 lpm - 7 am) to go uncovered per week and still receive credit for the uncovered
nursing shifts component. The second component of nursing services was nursing hours.
Each nursing home had to have 0.7 hours or more per day of licensed nursing services
and

1 .8

hours or more per day total for nursing services.
The dietary requirement was worth 5 points in the weighted index of quality.
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Nursing homes had to employ a professional dietitian and have their menus planned in
advance and sufficiently prepared in order to receive credit for this item.
The restorative services were included to show efforts to improve the physical
health o f the patients. Nursing homes with services prescribed, qualified therapists
employed, some equipment including parallel bars or steps and records kept on the
progress of the patients received 5 points for this item.
The 10 points available for patient activities were broken into two components.
Having a staff program director or organized voluntary agency provide religious services
was worth 3 points. Television, current magazines, daily newspapers and other scheduled
entertainment available to the patients made up the other 7 points for this item.
The physical plant item had 3 components for a total of 15 points. Sprinklers
were worth

6

points. Handrails were worth 3 points. A centrally located nursing station,

nurses call system, medication area, charting equipment and an access corridor were all
required for the remaining 6 points.
Valid orders written in the last 6 months, including diet, had to be listed in the
doctor's order book in order to receive the 2 points for this item. Corresponding diet
information along with identification, diagnosis and a nursing plan had to be included in
the nursing kardex for 3 points.
A sample of patient record were obtained by Levey, et al. from each of the 129
nursing homes in the data. They drew a sample of 2 patient records from facilities with
3-20 patients, 4 patient records from facilities with 21-40 patients and 6 patient records
from facilities with more than 40 patients. The nursing home received 8 points if all of
the patient records contained physical findings, diagnosis, date of examination, activity
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status, doctor's progress notes, nurses’ notes and medication records. The facility received
another 2 points if the patient record included the physician's signature, the reason for
admission and the patient's past medical history.
The facilities received 7 points for personal care o f the patients if the patients
were clean, had clean clothes and were well groomed. Another 3 points were added to
the quality index if the bedside units were clean and in good condition and the equipment
was clean and complete.
Levey, et al. showed a dramatic overall increase in the quality of care from 1965
to 1969 based on the weighted index they developed. Only one o f the items in the index,
personal care, indicated a decrease in the quality of care. The criterion for personal care
of the patients was met by 89.4% of the facilities in 1965 and fell to 78.3% in 1969 and
personal care o f the bedside unit was met by 59.7% o f the facilities in 1965 compared to
54.6% in 1969. These differences were attributed to changes in Medicare and Medicaid
requirements and to changes in the rate-setting formula used by the state for the period.
A correlation coefficient between per diem average total costs and the composite
measure o f quality o f care for 1965 and 1969 was calculated by Levey, et al. using the
Pearson r. In 1965, the correlation was 0.36 and statistically significant. The correlation
was 0.48 and statistically significant in 1969. These correlations indicate a close, positive
relationship between expenditures and quality of care.
Two models were presented by Levey, et al. to analyzed the effect of ownership
on the quality of care. They first compared the means o f the composite quality variable
for each of three ownership types: noncorporate proprietary, corporate proprietary, and
corporate charitable. The results o f this model indicated no relationship between
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ownership and quality of care.
Tests for the significance o f differences between means indicate that within
any given year, differences in mean quality-of-care ratings by the three
ownership types were not significant at the .05 level... Disaggregating the
quality-of-care measure into its nine major components and analyzing each
score by type of ownership also indicated the lack o f any statistically
significant relationship at the .05 level of significance between ownership type
and the individual dimensions of quality.
The second model comparing the quality of care for different ownership types
used stepwise multiple regression to determine the relationship between ownership and
quality of care controlling for the effects of average per diem total cost, percent of the
patients on Medicaid, size of the facility, age, certification as an extended care facility,
and region. Separate regressions were run for 1965 and 1969. Ownership type was
divided into proprietary and nonproprietary. Average total costs, percent o f patients on
Medicaid and size, measured by the number of beds per facility, were continuous
variables. Age o f the facility was an indicator for nursing homes over 20 years old.
Region was an indicator for the greater Boston area.
The regression results reported by Levey, et al. confirmed the lack of relationship
between ownership type and quality of care. Average total cost in the regression had a
high, positive and statistically significant relationship to quality o f care for both 1965 and
1969. A one dollar per day increase in total costs corresponded to a 3.24 point increase in
the composite measure of quality in 1965. In 1969, the increase was 1.19 points per one
dollar increase in per diem total costs. Size had a positive and statistically significant
effect in 1965, but not in 1969. Certification as an extended care facility had a positive
and statistically significant effect in 1969, but not in 1965. The other variables were not

"’Levey, et al., page 226.
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statistically significant. The R^djusted of the regressions shows that less than 30% o f the
variation in quality was explained by the regressors for both 1965 and 1969.
Levey, et al. were unable to find a significant relationship between type of
ownership and quality of care in either of the models they presented in this paper. The
process they used to determine the list of factors and weights to measure the level of
quality at each facility made the index robust and highly credible. They may have been
able to separate more of the variation in quality if they had allowed partial credit for
partial compliance with the items in the index.
The three papers reviewed in this section represent a small sample of the work
that has been done to compare quality of care at nursing homes. The basic idea that all of
the works agree upon is that quality of care is difficult to measure quantitatively because
of the subjective nature of the concept. The papers by Holmberg and Anderson, and
Levey, et al. used process oriented factors to examine the quality of care for nursing
homes. Output measures were determined by both groups to be more difficult to quantify
and defend. The results regarding the lack of relationship between ownership and quality
of care were consistent in the two papers. Observing no difference in the quality of care
begs the question of quantity. The next section will summarize two studies regarding
efficiency in production for a particular sector of the health care industry, physician
services.
Section 3: The Supply of Nursing Home Care
The inspiration for this analysis actually stems from similar studies for physician
services. Reinhardt in 1971 developed a production function for physician services in
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the United States to show that office based, self-employed physicians could profitably
increase their output by 25% by employing more aides. The analysis pooled the data
from two cross-section samples of physicians taken in 1965 and 1967 from the American
Medical Association’s list of practicing physicians. The 3 types of employees, or aides as
he referred to them, in physicians’ offices were RN's, technicians, and office workers,
each catagorized as full-time or part-time. Physicians’ work hours were divided up into
time spent in the office, at the hospital and on home visits. Capital was estimated by
subtracting salaries, medical supplies and automobile expenses from the annual total of
professional expenses, leaving a rough estimate of rent and depreciation on capital goods.
Reinhardt modified the production function in his model to allow for the
possibility of positive output with no inputs other than the labor of the physicians
themselves. The production function was estimated using three different measures of
output: total patient visits; office visits; and patient billings. One particularly interesting
result is the statistically significant coefficient on the year indicator variable in the
estimation using patient billings as the measure of output and not in either of the two
other estimations. The year indicator does not seem important until it is taken into
account that Medicare was introduced in 1966, between the two survey years. The
interpretation is that physicians probably increased their fees as well as started billing
what might have been considered overhead previously. The fact that it was only
significant when output was measured by patient billings implies that there was not any
significant change in technology to explain the increase in output. It may also mean that
billings is a poor measure o f output.
Reinhardt included each type o f aide separately in each estimation of the
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production function, but aggregates them into a single group when calculating the
profitable increase in the number of aides available to physicians. This approach does not
differentiate between an increase in the number of secretaries and an increase in the
number of technicians, though it should be obvious that one would increase output more
than the other. The intent of the paper was not to convince each physician to hire more
aides. Rather it was to point out that if physicians increased the number of aides on
average, then they could increase total production of physician services for each hour of
physician labor. An implied assumption is that the proportion of each type of aide in the
general population of aides will remain stable.
Brown expanded Reinhardt's analysis of group practice versus solo practice by
separating group practices by the number of physicians in the group. He used the same
production function in 1988 that Reinhardt used in 1971. Further, Brown had a larger
cross-section sample of 3,482 office-based physicians nationwide taken in 1976 provided
by the National Opinion Research Center for the Health Care Financing Administration.
The data were divided up into 15 different physician specialties. Psychiatrists were
excluded as a group because the production function for psychiatrists was unlike that of
the other fourteen specialties. He pooled the data and included an indicator for each
specialty in the estimation of the production function.
The output variable in the production function estimated by Brown was total
office visits per week. The labor variables in the production function were total physician
hours per week, average number o f secretarial, administrative and clerical hours per
week, total RN hours per week, total LPN hours per week, total technician hours per
week, and total hours per week for physician assistants and extenders. Capital was
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measured in total square feet of office space. Other variables he included were an
indicator for whether or not the physician was part of a group practice, the percent of the
physician's total visits made in a hospital, years of experience as a physician, an indicator
for whether or not the physician was board certified, indicator variables for each
specialty, interaction variables for the product of each specialty indicator times the group
practice indicator, and interaction variables for the product of each labor variable other
than the physician's own hours times the group indicator.
The inputs had a stronger relationship to output in Brown's estimation of the
production function than in Reinhardt's. Data quality and the expanded list of
explanatory variables can be attributed to the better fit of Brown's data to the model.
Brown found that group practices produced more output per hour of physician labor than
did solo practices. Specifically, physicians in practices with 2-5 physicians produced 1836% more output than solo physicians on average. Brown was also able to calculate the
marginal product and relative efficiency ratio for each type o f aide individually as well as
overall. His calculations show that most types of aides were overutilized relative to
physicians in 1976, exactly contrary to Reinhardt’s results using data from 10 years
previous. Practical nurses were the exception for solo practices and for all physicians
taken together. The exception for group practices was physician assistants. According to
his results, the use o f aides other than the exceptions listed should have been curbed
relative to the number of physician hours in order to increase efficiency.
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Chapter 3: Specification
Section 1: Purpose
The work o f Levey et al., Holmberg and Anderson, and Kart and Manard indicate
that there is concern about the possible difference in quality of care provided by nursing
homes with different operating structures. The work done by Reinhardt and Brown
evaluating the ability of physicians to efficiently utilize the production inputs shows a
potential problem in the health care industry with utilization o f inputs to produce
adequate quantities of output. Combining the concerns addressed by these analyses leads
to a question that has not yet been raised in published professional work: How do
ownership type and affiliation with a chain affect the quantity and efficiency of
production in nursing homes?
For-profit, non-profit and government nursing homes will operate differently
based on different production goals. The concern here is that there may be a conflict
between the interests of the owners and the interests of the patients. The goal of for-profit
nursing homes is to maximize profit. The goal of government and non-profit nursing
homes are focused on either cost minimization or output maximization subject to a cost
constraint.
The nursing home industry is best described by the theoretical fi-amework of
monopolistic competition. The fact that nursing homes charge different prices indicates it
is not a perfectly competitive market. Certificate o f need laws present a significant
barrier to entry into the market by requiring approval firom the state to build or expand a
nursing home beyond certain limits based on the current occupancy of nursing home beds
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and the elderly population in the area/ Each nursing home must differentiate itself from
the others based on location, quality of medical care, or other patient amenities. Patients
are able to gather information and choose a nursing home based on their own tastes and
their ability to pay. Price is a more important factor for patients who both lack long term
care insurance and do not qualify for Medicaid.
Nursing homes in a monopolistically competitive market face downward sloping
demand curves. That means they have some influence over prices with consideration
given to their output goals. Raising the price will decrease the quantity demanded for a
particular nursing home if all else is equal. This does not mean a single nursing home
will lose all of their patients to lower priced alternatives when they raise their price.
Lowering the price, all else equal, will increase the quantity of care demanded for that
nursing home.
This chapter will explain the methodology used to answer the questions of
efficiency and quantity of production for nursing homes. The first part will develop a
production function which can be used to express the relationship between production
inputs and output. The second part will describe a method for comparing the efficiency
of input utilization for each type of nursing home. The third and final part will show how
output levels can be directly compared between different organizational structures.
Section 2: The Cobb-Douglas Production Function
A production function expresses the relationship between the amount of each
input used to the amount o f care provided by the nursing homes. This analysis used a
Cobb-Douglas style o f production function. Cobb-Douglas production functions are of
'Montana Code Annotated 50-5-304 (11).
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the form
Q=AL^'K^"

(Equation 1)

where Q is the quantity o f output, A is a constant, L is the quantity of labor input and K is
the quantity of capital input. The exponents, p, and P2 show the relative impact of
changes in that input.
As a simple example, suppose that Pi and P2 are both equal to 1/2. If both labor
and capital are doubled, output will also double because:
Ai2Lf\2Kf^

AJl''^K^'^

=

(Equation 2)

In this equation, 2 is the scale factor. The implied exponent on the scale factor is 1,
which means the equation is homogeneous of degree 1. The degree of homogeneity can
be found quickly in this type of production function by adding the exponents. Pi and P2 .
One of the convenient economic properties of the Cobb-Douglas functions is that
the degree of homogeneity is equal to the sum of the exponents. This allows for the
simple application of scale factors. A one-to-one relationship between the multiplicative
change in all inputs and the change in output is called constant returns to scale. If the
sum of the exponents were greater than I, the case would be increasing returns to scale
and doubling the inputs would more than double the output. Decreasing returns to scale
is the case where the sum of the exponents is less than

1

and doubling the inputs would

less than double the output.
The output for nursing homes is measured in patient days per year. Capital and
labor are the production inputs included in this analysis. The level of capital is
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approximated using the number of licensed beds. This is a standard way of measuring the
"size" o f institutions such as nursing homes and hospitals. Labor was divided into three
or five categories depending on the available data. Registered nurses, licensed practical
nurses and a category called "other" labor were available for all years. Aides and
administrative staff were factored out of the "other" category for the two most recent
years o f data.
The basic forms of the production functions using the different types of labor
along with capital and quality are
(Equations)
Q=

(Equation 4)

Here Q is the number of patient days for the year, Li is the number o f RN labor hours for
the year, L2 is the number o f LPN labor hours for the year, L3 is the number of other labor
hours including aides and administrators for the year, L4 is the number of aide hours for
the year, L5 is the number of administrative hours for the year, Le is the number of other
labor hours for the year excluding aides and administrators, K is the number of licensed
beds and A is a scale factor. A is defined by
A = exp(/% + ^

+

- ^ 2

^4 ^ 4 )

(Equation 5)
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where P is the level o f quality, or price, and B2 , B 3 and B4 are indicators for the 2"^, 3"* and
4* quartile ranges for the number of beds. Including the size of nursing homes
categorically in the scale factor instead of factoring beds out of the entire function
allowed nursing homes to be compared within a given size range. Nursing homes are
assumed to be operating near capacity which means output per bed is nearly constant for
all nursing homes regardless of the per bed labor inputs.
Section 4: Quality of Care
Quality of care must be included when comparing nursing homes so that they can
be meaningfully evaluated. Nursing homes that focus on maximizing output (or profit) to
the detriment of the quality of care, should not be regarded as performing better than the
homes that produce moderate or high levels o f both output and quality.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no ideal method for measuring quality. There
are many ways to approximate it. Average revenue per patient day, or price per patient
day, is the proxy measure for quality used in this analysis. Average revenue per patient
day is closely tied to average cost per patient day not only because of the zero economic
profit condition of competitive markets, but also because of the way Medicaid operates in
Montana. Nursing homes are reimbursed by Medicaid on a cost basis* subject to a
maximum o f 103% of statewide median costs with an incentive of 20% of the difference
between the operating cost and the maximum, up to

1 0

% of the maximum.’

Nursing home care was found to be price elastic by Chiswick and inelastic, but
nearly unitary elastic, for private patients by Lamberton, et al. In both cases, the
^Administrative Rules o f Montana, 46.12.1226.
^Ibid, 46.12.1229 subsection 4.
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Utilization o f nursing home care would decrease with an increase in price if all else were
equal. The fact that some nursing homes can charge more in a competitive market means
that all else is not equal. It is assumed that the reason some nursing homes can charge
higher prices is that they provide a higher quality of care that patients are willing to pay a
premium for. Factors which may contribute to the higher prices are preferred location,
better medical staff, or better patient amenities like better food and newer buildings and
equipment.
There is a potential problem associated with the inclusion of quality in the
production function. Quality and quantity are both functions of the inputs because they
are both output goals. It is assumed here that the quality of care is determined by the
quality of the inputs and not the quantity. More nurses should produce more output, but
better nurses should produce a higher quality of care. In a highly regulated market such
as the nursing home industry it is likely that the level of quality is determined by forces
outside the production function and it can therefore be included as an independent
variable.
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Section 5: Economies of Scale
It would also be inaccurate to compare efficiency of large nursing homes to that of
the smaller nursing homes. There is a minimum setup cost associated with producing the
first unit of output. Small nursing homes are legally required to have 24-hour nursing
staff just like the large nursing homes.® If that minimum staffing requirement covers 100
licensed beds instead of 25, then the average costs are naturally lower. Economies of
scale is the condition where decreasing average costs are associated with higher quantities
of output.
The certificate of need laws in Montana hinder the production of large nursing
homes in most areas of the state because of the low population density. The smaller
nursing homes may be producing as efficiently as possible and still not compare to the
larger ones in the population centers. In order to separate the effect of size from the
analysis of efficiency, indicators were added to the production function to separate
nursing homes into size ranges. The indicators for nursing home size are Bz,

and B4 in

equation 5. The ranges group the nursing homes into quartiles based on the number of
beds.
Section 5: Relative Efficiency Ratios by Ownership Type
Changes in the output due to structural differences in ownership type can be
isolated by including indicator variables in equation 5.
A* = exp(^o + r ^ + 4 ^ , + 4 A + ^ A

+«4 A )

(Equation 6 )

Here D, and Dz are binary indicators for government and non-profit nursing homes.
'Montana Code Annotated, 50-5-101.
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respectively. The base case in this equation is for-profit nursing homes in the first
quartile range of sizes.
The relationship between each input and the output is determined by the
corresponding exponent, or P, in equations 3 and 4. This relationship may vary
depending on the operating structure of the nursing home. To show this difference we
needed a new set of p's for each ownership type.
Isolating the effects of different ownership types was accomplished by
transforming the p's in equations 3 and 4 to include the binary variables indicating to
which ownership type they should be applied. The cross products of each input variable
and each indicator was added to the production function to yield the following
transformed P's.
(Equation 7)
A ' = A + 4 A +<^6A

(Equation 8)

A '= A + 4 A + 4 A

(Equation 9)

y%' = A + 4 A + ^ o A

(Equation 10)

Ps = ^ +

+<^2A

(Equation 11)

+^4 A

(Equation 12)
(Equation 13)

The transformed exponents are summarized for each type of ownership in Table 1.
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Table 1
Exponents Transformed by Ownership Type
Input

For-Profit

Government

Non-Profit

L,

Pi

p i + Ô3

p i + 84

P2

P 2 + Ô5

P2 + Se

Pb

P3

+ Ô7

P3 + 8 g

U
U
u
u
u

P4

P4 + 89

P4

P5

p 5 + Ô1I

p 5 + 812

p6

P e + 813

Pe

K

P?

P ? + 815

P 4 + 8 ,6

+ 8 ,0
+ 8 ,4

The production functions after substituting equation 6 and transforming the P's
can be written
Q=

(Equation 14)
(Equation 15)

A difference in the way each type of facility utilizes inputs would be apparent if any of
the ô's in equations 7-13 summarized in table 1 were found to be significant. A negative
6 would indicate lower utilization o f the input relative to the other inputs for the
corresponding ownership type in comparison to the base case, which is for-profit nursing
homes.
The effect o f a change in the quantity of a single input on the quantity of output is
called the marginal product of that input. Stated differently, the marginal product of an
input is the change in output due to a one-unit change in the input. Capital is measured in
licensed beds and output is measured in patient days. The marginal product of capital in

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

P age 39

this case would be the change in the number of patient days provided if a facility added
one more licensed bed.
The marginal product o f a factor of production is the partial derivative of the
production function with respect to that factor. The functions described in equations 3-4
and 14-15 are differentiable in the range of possible values so the marginal products are
easily calculated. The marginal products of labor and capital in equation 3 are as follows:

(Equation 16)
(Equation 17)

(Equation 18)
(Equation 19)
The marginal products o f labor and capital in equation 4 are as follows:
MP^ = p, [ AÉp

Lf Lf

MP^ = p

=A

4'

Lf

]

]

(Equation 21)

]

(Equation 22)

MP^ = P { A I ^

MP^ = A [ALf L f L f L f L f

MP^ ^ P , [ A l f i f L f L f L f K ^ ^ - ^ ^ ]

(Equation 20)

(Equation 23)
]

(Equation 24)
(Equation 25)

Substituting the transformed P’s and scale factor into equations 16-25 yields the marginal
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products of labor and capital for equations 14 and 15. The marginal products of labor and
capital in equation 14 are

(Equa.ion26)
(Equa.io„27)
(Equation 28)

The marginal products of labor and capital in equation 15 are as follows:
MPl, =

Lfi f i f

]

MPl,
MP^ =

(Equation 30)
(Equation 31)

if

if

]

(Equation 32)
(Equation 33)

MP^ = 0 ‘^ [ A 'L ^ /L fL fl^ É f^ -^ ^ K ^ ]
MP^ ^p;{A* L f Z f i f i f i f

]

(Equation 34)
(Equation 35)

It is useful when comparing efficiency of use between the various factors of
production to look at the marginal product per dollar spent on that input. The ratio of the
MP to the price of the input reveals the amount of output the facility would receive in
return for one more dollar spent on the input. These relative efficiency ratios are equal
when factors are being employed in such a way as to maximize efficiency.
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The usefulness of equating the relative efficiency ratios can be clearly
demonstrated by imagining a case where they are not equal. Suppose the marginal
product per dollar spent was greater for RN’s than for LPN's. That would imply that the
last dollar spent on RN’s yields more output than the last dollar spent on LPN’s. An
output maximizing firm with a cost constraint would increase employment of RN’s and
reduce employment of LPN's in order to get more output for the same cost.
A profit maximizing firm would consider the change in revenue associated with
the marginal product. Marginal revenue is the change in revenue due to a one unit change
in output. The downward sloping demand curve faced by nursing homes in monopolistic
competition means that marginal revenue is decreasing with increasing output. For-profit
nursing homes would seek to employ RN’s and LPN’s such that the cost for the last hour
of labor was equal to the marginal revenue gained from that hour. The marginal revenue
gained from an increase in output is the same if the increase in output came from an
increase in RN hours or an increase in LPN hours. For that reason, for-profit nursing
homes will also seek to equate the marginal product per dollar spent on each input. The
difference between this case and output maximization is that in order to maximize profits
this ratio must also equal the marginal revenue of the last unit of output.
Consider again the case where the marginal product per dollar spent of any input
is not equal to the marginal revenue. If one more hour of RN labor costs $25 and yields
one more hour of patient care for 24 patients (that is 1 patient day) at $100 per patient
day, then the profit maximizing firm should add another hour o f RN labor and then re
evaluate at the new production point. This process would continue until the cost of the
last unit of each labor input equals the value o f the increase in output from the last unit of
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that input. This example assumes that nursing homes can choose whether or not to
provide nursing care in each hour. This is not the case in practice, but the decision
making process is the same with larger time intervals. In the real world they are more
likely to be deciding whether or not to add another part time or full time nurse based on
the number o f patients being cared for on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
Section 6: Comparison of O utput Levels
The model presented so far compares the marginal product per dollar spent on
each input within the given ownership type to identify possible sources of inefficiency.
The results can be used to prescribe changes to improve the ability of nursing homes to
provide care for more patients. It does not compare the actual amount of care provided by
for-profit nursing homes versus all others. The model presented in this section was used
to make a direct comparison of output levels of for-profit and chain nursing homes versus
all others holding constant the utilization o f production inputs and the level of quality.
For this analysis, equation 5 was modified to include indicators for participation
in a chain and for-profit status instead of the two indicators for government and non
profit status as in equation 6 .
A

= exp(^ + yP + ô^jDj + gC + OCB +
2

2

+ ^4 ^ 4 )

(Equation 36)

Here D 3 indicates for-profit ownership and C indicates the nursing home is part of a
chain. Substituting this into equations 3 and 4 gives equations 37 and 38,
Q = A Zf

(Equation 37)

Q = A -L ^liL H iL '^K > ’

(Equation 38)
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A value greater than 0 for ôn in the estimation of equations 37 and 38 would indicate a
higher level o f output from for-profit nursing homes controlling for utilization levels of
production inputs and quality. A value greater than 0 for ôig in equations 37 and 38
would indicate the same for nursing homes operating as part of a chain.
The four possible structural categories to be evaluated for significant differences
are for-profit chain, non-profit chain, for-profit independent and non-profit independent.
Government nursing homes were grouped with the non-profits in this analysis in order to
focus the analysis on the effect of proprietary ownership. That will allow us to address
the effect the profit maximizing behavior of for-profit nursing homes has on output
compared to non-profit and government nursing homes.
Section 7: Summary
The models developed in this chapter were used to compare efficiency of input
utilization and overall output levels for for-profit, non-profit and government nursing
homes. Differences exist in the way these ownership types choose inputs and output
levels because of different production goals and operating structure. Equating the
marginal product per dollar spent on each input results in efficient utilization of the
factors o f production for both profit maximizing and output maximizing nursing homes.
The quality o f care was included in both models in order to hold constant the effects of
production decisions which are directed toward the quality of care independent of
quantity.
The Cobb-Douglas production function displays the relationship between the
factors o f production and output. Labor and capital were the factors of production
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included in the models outlined in this chapter. The production function was presented in
six forms:
Q= A L ^ L ^ L fK ^

(Equation 3)

Q=

(Equation 4)

Q= A*L f

(Equation 14)

Q= A ' i f l ÿ i f i f L f

(Equation 15)

Q= A**LP,'If L §K ^

(Equation 37)

Q= A ^ ^ L f l f L ^ L f L f K ^

(Equation 38)

Labor is separated into six categories: RN hours (L,), LPN hours (Lz), other labor
including aides and administrators

( L 3 ) ,

aides

( L 4 ) ,

administrators (Ls) and other labor not

including aides and administrators (Le). Capital (K) is measured by the number of
licensed beds at a nursing home. The scale factor was included in three forms A, A* and
A". They are defined as follows:
A = exp(^ + yP + <2 ^

+ <^4 - ^ 4 )

(Equation 5)

A* = exp(4 + yP + <5,A + 4 A + « 2 ^ 2 + « 3 A + «4 A )

(Equation 6)

A'* = exp(4 +yP+ô^^D^+S^fi+a^B^+a^B^+a^B^)

(Equation 36)

The transformed exponents in equations 14 and 15 include indicators which allow for the
separation of the effects o f different ownership types. They are defined as follows:
A* = 4 + 4 A + 4 A

(Equation 7)
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(Equation 8)
(Equation 9)
(Equation 10)
(Equation 11)
A' = A +

+^4 A

(Equation 12)

A = A + ^ sA + 4ôA

(Equation 13)

The next 2 chapters describe and apply firm level data to the model designed in
this chapter. The results can be used to identify inefficient input mixes and quantify the
differences in output between nursing homes of different ownership types and affiliation
with a chain.
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Data
Section 1: Sources
This analysis used data from the Annual Survey of Long Term Care Facilities
conducted by the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS).
Completion o f the survey is mandatory for all long term care facilities operating in
Montana in order to qualify for reimbursement from the Medicaid program. The DPHHS
survey contains information about patient age and residency, employees, revenue and
expenses for all of the long term care facilities in Montana for the years 1992 through
1998.
Traditional nursing homes are a subset of long term care facilities covered by the
DPHHS survey. Seven mental health and disabled care facilities were excluded from the
analysis. There were also seven facilities that were identified in the titles as transitional
care units that were excluded from the analysis. These fourteen institutions provide a
different type o f care than traditional nursing homes and were not included in the analysis
for that reason.
Other records from the DPHHS survey that were excluded had missing values in
all o f the fields. They may have returned incomplete surveys or not returned them at all.
There was one nursing home that had valid information for most fields, but did not report
any patient days in 1998. That record was also discarded.
Some minor corrections and "fixes" were made to the DPHHS data. There was a
typo that reported "Q5" full time LPN's instead of "15". There was a precision problem in
the formatting o f some of the fields resulting in fractional numbers of employees. They
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were rounded to an integer value. A few of the nursing homes reported patient days
where numbers o f patients was required. The number was converted into patient counts
by dividing by the number of days covered by the survey according to the "start" and
"end" dates filled in by the nursing home. If the "start" and "end" dates indicated that the
reported numbers covered less than a year, then the numbers were inflated to a yearly
value to be comparable with the rest of the data. A small number of missing values in the
numbers of employees were filled with the mean for that nursing home over the period if
there was little change in all other variables for that nursing home in the period.
Wage estimates from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics were obtained from the
Internet. The occupations that were defined well enough to be matched in both the
DPHHS data and the Standard Occupational Classification system used by the BLS were
"Registered Nurses", "Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses", and "Nursing
Aides, Orderlies and Attendants". Only the statewide average wage was used in this
analysis.
State and county population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau were obtained
from the Internet. The data contained population totals by age and gender for each county
in Montana. This data was used for the analysis of the elderly population in the last
section of this chapter.
Section 2: Organizational Structure
Nursing homes in the DPHHS survey were classified as for-profit, non-profit or
government. The coding was different in different years o f the data. For-profit and non
profit were easily distinguishable in all years, but government was sometimes coded as
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“state” or “county”. To avoid over-stratifying the data, and also for simplicity, state and
county nursing homes were included in the general category for government nursing
homes.
There is some inconsistency regarding the classification of nursing homes as non
profit or government. The two most recent years, 1997 and 1998, did not classify any
nursing homes as government. Facilities which had been coded as government in all
previous years changed to non-profit without changing name, ownership, or chain
affiliation. It is not clear from the names of the facilities in question to which category
the nursing homes should have been coded. In 1992 to 1996 some nursing homes with
“County” in the name were classified as government and others as non-profit.
Conversely, some of the homes listed as government did not seem to be associated with
the state or county. The tables in this chapter summarize the data as it was coded. The
government nursing homes that switched to non-profit were included as government in
the estimation of the production functions in the next chapter.

Table 2
Number of Nursing Homes in Montana
Year
1992

For-Profit
37

Non-Profit
40

Government
17

Total
94

1993

39

41

16

96

1994

38

41

15

94

1995

39

40

16

95

1996

38

41

17

96

1997

37

58

-

95

1998

36

59

-

95

!
1
1
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The ownership type most common among nursing homes in Montana for each of
the 7 years listed was non-profit. For-profit nursing homes were the second most
common and government nursing homes make up a small portion of the industry. Non
profit and government nursing homes combined account for between 5 9 and 62 percent of
nursing homes in any given year. The highest proportion of nursing homes represented
by for-profit homes is 41.1% in 1995.
There was an indicator in the data for whether or not the nursing home was part of
a chain. It was only available for the years 1994 to 1998. Table 3 lists the percent of
each ownership type that was indicated to be part o f a chain. It shows that for-profit
nursing homes were more likely to be part of a chain and that none of the nursing homes
classified as government were considered part of a chain.

Table 3
Percent of Nursing Homes
Owned b y Chains

0 .0 0

% of
Total
24.47

5.00

0 .0 0

25.26

65.79

4.87

0 .0 0

28.13

1997

70.27

6.90

-

31.58

1998

72.22

6.78

-

31.58

Year
1994

% of
For-Profit
55.26

% of
Non-Profit
4.87

1995

56.41

1996

% of
Government

The proportion o f for-profit nursing homes that were part of a chain was
increasing over the given time period. The inclusion of nursing homes previously
classified as government in the non-profit column should have decreased the proportion
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o f non-profits that were part o f a chain. Instead, the proportion jumped from 4.87% to
6.9%. The two reasons the proportion increased instead of decreasing were that one of
the nursing homes previously classified as government was indicated as being part of a
chain in 1997 and 1998, and two more nursing homes that were always classified as non
profit changed from not being part of a chain in 1996 to being part of a chain in 1997 and
1998.
Section 3: Patient Days
Patient days are the sum of all of the days spent by all of the patients at the facility
in one year. Patient days are a standard measure of output for health care firms such as
hospitals and nursing homes which commonly retain patients for more than 24 hours. It
applies itself well to measuring the output for long term care because there are not
specific, measurable health care procedures being performed each day for every patient.
Output for a surgeon, for example, could be measured in appendectomies; or a
psychiatrist’s output could be measured in visits. For long term care, each day could be
considered another completed procedure, regardless of what specific activities might have
been included in the day.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

P a g e 51

Table 4
Distribution of Patient Days
by Type and Year
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

For-Profit
1,059,692

Non-Profit Government
772,057
359,961

Total
2,191,710

48.35%

35.23%

16.42%

100.00%

1,215,552

778,562

268,018

2,262,132

53.73%

34.42%

11.85%

100.00%

1,223,395

794,826

225,580

2,243,801

54.52%

35.42%

10.05%

100.00%

1,233,667

774,184

252,037

2,259,888

54.59%

34.26%

11.15%

100.00%

1,154,976

835,718

260,256

2,250,950

51.31%

37.13%

11.56%

100.00%

1,124,231

1,096,969

-

2,221,200

50.61%

49.39%

100.00%

1,061,653

1,102,454

2,164,107

49.06%

50.94%

100.00%

A little over half of patient days are produced in for-profit nursing homes for 5 out
of the 7 years listed. For-profit nursing homes were producing more output with fewer
facilities. One reason for-profit nursing homes produced more is that the average size of
for-profit nursing homes was larger than that of non-profit or government nursing homes.
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Table 5
Percent of Patient Days in
Chain Nursing Homes

Year

% of
For Profit

% of
Non Profit

1994

57.85

4.28

0 .0 0

33.05

1995

60.36

4.43

0 .0 0

34.47

1996

69.83

3.91

0 .0 0

37.28

1997

72.16

8.61

-

40.78

1998

72.86

6.14

-

38.87

% of
Government

% of
Total

Table 5 shows that the percent of output that comes from chains is in the same
range as the percent of nursing homes that are listed as part of a chain, as seen in table 3.
Overall chains account for between 33 and 41 percent of output from 1994 to 1998, but
they account for 57 to 73 percent of output from for-profit nursing homes. Chains seem
to be increasing their market share overall.
There is no evidence so far that the quantity of nursing home care demanded has
been increasing over the given time period. The number of nursing homes has not
increased and the total output for nursing homes in the state has stayed in the 2 . 2 million
patient days per year range. The next section shows an increase in the number of licensed
beds over the same time period which may indicate an expected increase in demand in the
future.
Section 4: Licensed Beds
Licensed beds is a measure o f the amount of capital at a facility. The size of a
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long term care facility is usually measured in beds. There is a certain amount o f building
space and equipment associated with each bed that makes beds an accurate depiction of
capital utilization at a facility.

Table 6
Distribution of Licensed Beds
by Year and Type
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

For Profit
3,312

Non-Profit
2,225

Government
1,068

Total
6,605

50.14%

33.69%

16.17%

100.00%

3,713

2,260

790

6,763

54.90%

33.42%

11.68%

100.00%

3,695

2,338

693

6,726

54.94%

34.76%

10.30%

100.00%

3,810

2,293

748

6,851

55.61%

33.47%

10.92%

100.00%

3,642

2,534

788

6,964

52.30%

36.39%

11.32%

100.00%

3,720

3,364

52.51%

47.49%

3,711

3,411

52.11%

47.89%

-

7,084
100.00%

-

7,122
100.00%

The number o f licensed beds in Montana increased in each of the years listed in
table 6 except 1994. The number o f licensed beds is related to the elderly population in
an area according to the certificate of need requirements. That means that the elderly
population must have been increasing to justify the increase in the number of licensed
beds.
The number of licensed beds is almost evenly split between for-profit nursing
homes and all other ownership types according to table 6 . The percentage amount that
output favored for-profit nursing homes in table 4 was smaller than the difference in the
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percentage of licensed beds owned by for-profit nursing homes. That implies that the
reason output was higher in for-profit nursing homes was because they are much larger on
average than either government or non-profit nursing homes. Table 7 shows the
difference in output per licensed bed for each type of nursing home.

Table 7
Output per Licensed Bed
by Year and Type
Year
1992

For Profit

Non-Profit

319.96

1993

346.99

Government
337.04

Total
331.83

327.38

344.50

339.26

334.49

1994

331.09

339.96

325.51

333.60

1995

323.80

337.63

336.95

329.86

1996

317.13

329.80

330.27

323.23

1997

302.21

326.09

-

313.55

1998

286.08

323.21

303.86

Non-profit and government nursing homes produced more output per licensed bed
in all of the years 1992 to 1998. Comparing for-profit output per licensed bed to all
others in a two-tailed t-test showed these differences to be significant at the 0.05 level of
significance except for 1993,1994 and 1996. The maximum possible number of patient
days per bed is 366 in a leap year and 365 otherwise. Non-profit and government nursing
homes operate closer on average to the maximum capacity than for-profit nursing homes.
Operating below capacity is typical of firms in monopolistic competition. The
fact that for-profit nursing homes operate further below capacity than non-profit or
government nursing homes may be evidence of the willingness to restrict output to
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maintain the relationship between marginal revenue and marginal cost. Output
maximizing nursing homes would be less likely to leave a bed unfilled.
Table

8

shows that for-profit nursing homes are considerably larger on average

than non-profit or government nursing homes. The difference between the average size
of for-profit nursing homes and all others was statistically significant at the 0.05 level in
each o f the years listed. For-profit nursing homes also seem to be increasing in size faster
than non-profit and government nursing homes. Table

8

confirms the conclusion drawn

from table 6 that the years with higher total output were the result of the larger average
size of for-profit nursing homes. The overall trend toward larger nursing homes might
indicate that there are economies of scale.

Table 8
Average Number of Licensed Beds
by Year and Type
Y ear
1992

For Profit
89.51

Non-Profit

Government

Total

55.62

62.82

70.27

1993

95.21

55.12

49.38

70.45

1994

97.24

57.02

46.20

71.55

1995

97.69

57.33

46.75

72.12

1996

95.84

61.80

46.35

72.54

1997

100.54

58.00

-

74.57

1998

103.08

57.81

-

74.97

Section 5: Labor
Labor was measured in hours worked per year. The DPHHS data lists the number
o f part time and full time employees in each type of labor instead of the number of hours
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worked. Yearly hours of labor was calculated by multiplying the number of full-time
employees by 40hrs/week times 52 weeks/year and adding it to the number of part-time
employees times 20hrs/week times 52 weeks/year. This process assumes a standard 40
hour work week for full-time employees and 2 0 hour week for part-time employees.
The highest skilled medical labor listed in the data was registered nurses. The
average number o f RN hours per licensed bed per year is summarized in table 9.

Table 9
Average Number of RN Hours per Licensed Bed
by Year and Type
Year
1992

For Profit
147.02

Non-Profit
216.94

Government
284.24

Total
201.59

1993

162.21

246.96

309.79

223.00

1994

160.32

247.98

285.99

218.61

1995

170.07

299.02

285.99

218.61

1996

189.88

292.20

274.06

248.48

1997

169.74

275.36

-

234.23

1998

177.48

256.35

-

226.46

Non-profit and government nursing homes utilized registered nurses much more
intensively than for-profit nursing homes. The differences were all statistically
significant at the 0.05 level of significance when comparing for-profit utilization rates to
all others. Registered nurses were the highest skilled labor input included in the analysis
and they were also the most expensive. The fact that for-profit nursing homes compare
the value o f the output to the value of the input may explain the difference in utilization
rates.
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Licensed practical nurses are the second most highly skilled form of labor
presented in this analysis. Table 10 summarizes the average number of LPN hours per
bed for each ownership type.
■ ■■■

Table 10
Average Number of LPN Hours Per Licensed Bed
by Year and Type
Non-Profit
200.26

Government

Total

1992

For Profit
194.22

146.10

188.09

1993

189.60

214.99

157.11

195.03

1994

182.29

198.36

148.57

183.92

1995

181.28

204.06

158.76

187.08

1996

190.14

2 0 2 .6 8

149.39

188.28

1997

179.92

186.23

-

183.77

1998

181.52

180.44

-

180.85

Year

The difference in utilization rates of LPN’s was not statistically significant at the
0.05 level between any of the ownership types. The number of LPN hours per licensed
bed was about the same as RN’s in the for-profit category. The utilization rate o f LPN’s
was significantly lower than that o f RN's at the 0.05 level of significance in all years for
both non-profit and government nursing homes. There is a high rate of technical
substitution between the two types of labor because they are both qualified to perform
most of the everyday tasks involved with elderly care. There is no clear explanation for
the difference in utilization rates between RN labor and LPN labor at non-profit and
government nursing homes.
All seven years of data had a category of labor called “other”. It is unfortunate
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that there was not more detailed information available for all years. The last two years,
1997 and 1998 separated aides and administrative employees from the rest of the “other”
category. These were added back into the “other” category for consistency in table 11.

Table 11
Average Number of Other Labor Hours
Including Aides and Administrative Employees
Per Licensed Bed by Year and Type
Year

For Profit
1,383.00

Non-Profit
1,333.78

Government
1,694.68

Total
1,418.42

1992
1993

1,362.12

1,310.91

1,632.72

1,385.35

1994

1,443.64

1,385.04

1,543.72

1,434.05

1995

1,420.65

1,541.54

1,827.32

1,540.09

1996

1,352.76

1,391.03

1,686.32

1,428.17

1997

1,442.68

1,664.76

1,577.35

1998

1,305.95

1,625.59

1,504.46

There are numerous employees at a nursing home who are not RN’s or LPN’s.
That is why the high number of other labor hours per licensed bed for all ownership types
is not surprising. Aggregation o f the different types of labor in this group did not allow
for any comparisons to be made regarding efficiency. The analysis was performed
separately on years 1997 and 1998 so that the effects of aides and administrative
employees could be evaluated.
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Table 12
Average Number of Aide Hours
Per Licensed Bed by Year and Type
For Profit
715.40

Non-Profit
905.23

Total
831.30

709.19

871.76

810-15

I

Aides are responsible for a large portion of the routine tasks required for the
personal care of the patients in nursing homes. They have the most hands-on contact with
the patients. They are also the least expensive of the patient care employees. It does not
seem unusual that aide hours per licensed bed were so much higher than either o f the
nurse hours. The difference in aide utilization rates between for-profit and non-profit
nursing homes was statistically significant at the 0.05 level in both years.
The differences in the number of administrative employees between for-profit and
non-profit nursing homes was not statistically significant. It is difficult to judge the
appropriate level of administrative labor relative to the others summarized in this section.
It is worth noting that many of the administrators in nursing homes are former or current
registered nurses and could perform a dual role as nurse and administrator.

Table 13
Average Number of Administrative Hours
Per Licensed Bed by Year and Type
Year

For Profit

Non-Profit

Total

1997

111.52

140.95

129.37

1998

107.92

112.86

110.99
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Section 6 : Prices
Price was measured for this analysis as the average revenue from patient care per
patient day. The prices each nursing home charged their patients was not recorded in the
DPHHS survey data, but it included gross annual revenue and the percentage of the
revenue that came from each of seven possible sources. The sources were Medicaid,
Medicare, insurance, private pay, grants, contributions and other. The patient care
portion of revenue was the portion of gross revenue that came from Medicaid, Medicare,
insurance or private pay. The sum o f these percentages multiplied by the gross revenue
was divided by the number of patient days to approximate the prices charged to patients
for patient care.

Table 14
Average Revenue per Patient Day (Price)
by Year and Type
Year

For Profit

Non-Profit

Government

1992

73.39

98.10

83.05

Total
85.92

1993

79.66

96.64

92.49

89.25

1994

81.20

93.10

105.90

90.33

1995

94.31

107.47

90.31

99.18

1996

94.51

101.33

87.68

96.21

1997

95.22

115.67

—

107.84

1998

107.77

118.44

—

114.40

There was a high variance in prices overall and within each of the ownership
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types. The differences in the means appear distinct, but none of the differences between
the annual averages of the different groups was statistically significant, nor were they
different from the overall average at the 0.05 level of significance. Average daily prices
increased by a total o f 33% from 1992 to 1998.
Section 7: Wage Estimates
The wage rate for each type o f labor was necessary for the evaluation of
efficiency. Wage estimates were available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for
Billings, Missoula, Great Falls and the balance o f the state not including these areas, and
also for the state as a whole. Only the statewide average wage was used in the analysis of
efficiency in the next chapter. Wages were also estimated using the data in the DPHHS
survey for comparison to the BLS estimates. Total payroll expenses were reported on the
survey for almost all of the nursing homes in all of the years. This variable was regressed
against the labor input variables described previously in this chapter for all years for
which data was available to produce an estimate of the hourly wages for each type of
labor. The results were not consistent with the BLS estimates and were generally much
higher. It is possible that total payroll expenses includes overtime pay and benefits which
are not part of the BLS estimates.
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Table 15
Statewide Wage Estimates
1999 BLS
Statewide
Average

Regression 1 (1992-1996)

Regression 2 (1997-1998)

Est. P

Std. Err.^

t

Est. P

Std. E rr.:

t

RN

17.61

22.25

4.970

4.48

27.87

7.320

3.81

LPN

11.19

19.42

4.082

4.76

20.55

6.306

3.26

5.31

0.950

5.59

Variables*

ALLOTHER
AIDE

—

7.75

ADMIN

—

OTHER

—

—

“ “

—

—

—

—

N=466, R'adjusted 0.8152

—

—

9.56

2.034

4.70

—

-5.34

6.206

-0.86

—

1.87

1.497

1.26

N=177,R'adjusted"0.91 80

' ADMIN,OTHER and ALLOTHER were included in the regressions but are not considered an estimate
of the price o f these inputs.
^ Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.

The diversity of jobs included in the administrative and "other" categories
precluded the use of a single wage rate as the unit cost of those inputs. The small or
negative values and the lack of statistical significance in the later time period for these
variables also excluded them fi-om consideration. It is unfortunate for the purpose of this
analysis that more detailed information was not available for labor inputs.
Administration and "other" labor is a likely source of inefficiency because those jobs are
not directly related to patient care.
Section 8 : Population Estimates
This section offers a brief discussion o f the elderly population statewide and in
nursing homes in Montana. The purpose is to present more evidence of increasing
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demand for nursing home care in Montana. Increasing demand for nursing home care
creates a need for the analysis presented in the remainder of this paper regarding the
ability of nursing homes to provide the required care efficiently.

Table 16
State and Nursing Home Populations
by Age Group and Year
Ages 65 to 74

Ages 75 to 84

Ages 85 and Over

Year

NH

State

%NH

NH

State

%NH

NH

State

%NH

1992

868

60,895

1.43

2,361

37,442

6.31

3,126

11,537

27.1

1993

707

61,096

1.16

2,227 38,375

5.80

2,766

12,045

23.0

1994

749

61,190

1.22

2,148 39,323

5.46

2,822

12,593

22.4

1995

713

61,540

1.16

2,177 40,053

5.44

2,906

13,159

22.1

1996

1,227 61,471

2.00

2,901

40,595

7.15

2,799

13,810

20.3

1997

1,345 60,949

2.21

3,090 41,296

7.48

2,804

14,214

19.7

1998

1,221

2.01

3,083 41,522

7.42

2,834

14,788

19.2

60,615

The oldest age group had the largest proportion of the population living in nursing
homes. That is consistent with the trends referenced in the literature on nursing homes.
However the representation of this group in nursing homes was declining while the
representation of the other two age groups seems to have been increasing. One reason
that the demand for nursing home care could be assumed to be increasing is that the
proportion of the "young old" age groups in nursing homes has been increasing. A
second reason is that the age group with the highest proportion of its members in nursing
homes has been growing due to the general aging o f the population. Table 17 shows the
overall distribution o f people over the age o f 65 by age group and gender.
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There was cause to question the quality of the DPHHS survey in reporting the
numbers o f patients displayed in table 16. The sudden increase in the total nursing home
population in 1996 was 1,131 people more than the previous year. As shown in table 6 ,
there were only 113 more licensed beds in 1996 than in 1995. In order for 113 additional
beds to accommodate 1,131 additional patients there would have to have been

1 0

patients

per bed. That equates to an average stay of 1.2 months per patient. A possible
explanation is that they switched from a point-in-time person count to a total for the year.
The proportions of people living in nursing homes were not altered dramatically enough
to change any conclusions about the relationship between age and demand for nursing
home services.
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Table 17
Distribution of the State Population Over 65
by Gender, Age Group and Year
Ages 65 to 74
Year Men Women Total
1992 28,517 32,378 60,895

1

Ages 75 to 84

Ages 85 and Over

Men Women Total

Men Women Total

15,620 21,822

37,442

3,505

8,032 11,537

59.86%

52.03%

55.42%

32.79%

35.07%

34.08%

7.36%

12.91% 10.50%

1993 28,802

32,294

61,096

15,959

22,416

38,375

3,711

8,334 12,045

59.42%

51.22%

5 4 .7 9 %

32.92%

35.56%

34.41%

7.66%

13.22% 10.80%

1994 28,832

32,358

61,190

16,427 22,896

39,323

3,891

8,702 12,593

58.66%

50.59%

54.10%

33.42%

35.80%

34.77%

7.92%

13.61% 11.13%

1995 29,099 32,441

61,540

16,853

23,200 40,053

4,051

9,108 13,159

53.63%

33.70%

35.83%

34.90%

8.10%

14.07% 11.47%

32,270 61,471

17,200 23,395

40,595

4,302

9,508 13,810

49.51%

53.05%

33.92%

35.03%

8.48%

14.59% 11.92%

1997 28,878 32,071

60,949

17,566 23,730 41,296

4,487

9,727 14,214

56.70%

48.94%

52.34%

36.21%

35.46%

8.81%

14.84% 12.21%

1998 28,753

31,862

60,615

17,609 23,913 41,522

4,708

10,080 14,788

56.30%

48.38%

51.84%

34.48%

9.22%

15.31% 12.65%

58.19%

1996 29,201
57.59%

50.10%

3 4 .4 9 %

35.90%

36.31%

35.51%

Table 17 shows that the over-65 population in Montana was moving into the older
age groups. The older age groups are more likely to require nursing home care and also
more likely to purchase nursing home care as shown in table 16. Tables 16 and 17
together give strong evidence that the aging population is driving a steady increase in the
demand for nursing home care. The increase in demand for nursing home care is
important to this analysis because it gives rise to a need for analyses of this type.
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Chapter 5: Estimation and Results
Section 1: The Basic Production Function
Production functions are not linear by design. Linearity would imply a constant
relationship between inputs and output which does not change at different levels of input
or output. Diminishing marginal product is the idea that the marginal product realized
from the addition o f an input must eventually fall when too much of the input is
employed. Based on diminishing marginal product, the slope of the production function
which maps the relationship between inputs and output cannot be constant for all
combinations of inputs and output. The linear estimation methods used in this chapter
require the linear form of the production function.
The production function was estimated without controls for ownership type,
involvement with a chain, size or quality to assure that the general relationship between
the inputs and output was as expected. Without those variables, equation 5 reduces to
. Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of equations 3 and 4 and applying the
rules of natural logs to turn the exponents into coefficients yields the linear forms of the
basic production functions.
ln ( 0 )= jeo + ^,ln (L ,)+ ^ 2 ln(Z 2 )+ ^ 3 ln(L 3 )+/ 9 7 ln{/:)

(Equation 39)

k(g)=^o+^,hi(L,)+^2ln(lJ+^,ln(Lj+^;ln(Lj
+P^]n{L^)-{-p^ln{K)

(Equation 40)

The names of the variables were changed to simplify references to them in discussion.
Table 18 summarizes the variables used in the analysis and their common names.
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Table 18
Variable Summary

Description

Model
Name

Estimation
Name

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Patient Days

Q

DAYS

2,275

96,064

23,449

Registered Nurse
Hours

L,

RN

2,080

49,920

14,100

Licensed Practical
Nurse Hours

Lz

LPN

0

63,440

12,757

Other Labor Hours
Including Aides and
Administrators

U

ALLOTHER

0

486,720

102,938

Aide Hours

u

AIDE

6,240

215,280

58,651

Administrative
Hours

Ls

ADMIN

0

30,160

7,274

Other Labor Hours
Excluding Aides and
Administrators

U

OTHER

0

215,280

40,500

Licensed Beds

K

BEDS

9

279

72

Government

D,

GOV

0

1

0.16

Non-Profit

Dz

NP

0

1

0.44

For-Profit

Da

FP

0

1

0.40

Chain

C

CHAIN

0

1

0.28

Average Daily
Revenue from
Patient Care

P

PRICE

28.43

194.82

;

;

89.99

The natural logarithm o f DAYS, InDAYS, is the dependent variable in the
ordinary least squares regression used to estimate the parameters in the linear form o f the
production function. The dependent variables in equation 39 are hiRN, InLPN,
InALLOTHER and InBEDS. The dependent variables in equation 40 are InRN, InLPN,
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InAIDE, InADMIN, InOTHER and InBEDS. The output of a nursing home is expected to
rise when they add licensed beds and when they add additional employees. For that
reason, all o f the independent variables in both equations are hypothesized to have a
positive impact on InDAYS.

Table 19
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
With No Controls
Equation 39
Variables

Equation 40

Est. p

Std. E rro r

t

Est. p

Std. E rro r

t

InRN

0.042

0.013

3.17

0.025

0.027

0.93

InLPN

0.037

0.010

3.23

0.027

0.018

1.51

InALLOTHER

0.073

0.019

3.85

—

—

—

0.190

0.036

5.31

InADMIN

—

—

-0.006

0.017

-0.35

InOTHER

—

—

-0.013

0.017

-0.75

InAIDE

—

—

InBEDS

0.878

0.022

40.10

0.783

0.042

21.53

CONSTANT

4.738

0.171

27.78

4.280

0.287

14.92

N=655, R=adjusicd~0.9481

N==178, R' adjuste(T^0.9508

The results in table 19 indicate that the regressors do a very good job of
explaining variation in the dependent variable, InDAYS. The Readjusted for the estimation
of equation 39 indicates that over 94% of the variation in InDAYS is explained by the
independent variables. The figure is even higher, over 95%, for the estimation of
equation 40. The estimated coefficients for equation 39 are all positive, as expected. The
estimated coefficients of InADMIN and InOTHER in the estimation of equation 40 turned
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out to be negative, but they are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level of
significance. In fact, the only variables that are statistically significant in the estimation
of equation 40 are InBEDS, InAIDES and the constant. All of the variables in the
estimation of equation 39 were statistically significant.
Two major problems that arose in the estimation of equations 39 and 40 which
undermine interpretation o f the results were multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity.
Multicollinearity refers to the linear relationship between independent variables and
heteroskedasticity is a non-homogeneous distribution of the residuals fi-om the regression.
Section 2; Controlling for Size
Multicollinearity was unavoidable in this model because of the high correlation
among all o f the variables. Larger nursing homes have more licensed beds and more staff
and smaller ones have less of each input. Tables 20 and 21 show the correlation matrices
for the input variables used to estimate equations 39 and 40.

Table 20
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
BEDS
BEDS

RN

LPN

ALLOTHER

1 .0 0 0 0

RN

0.6785

1 .0 0 0 0

LPN

0.8267

0.4331

1 .0 0 0 0

A LLOTHER

0.9019

0.6587

0.8050

1 .0 0 0 0
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Table 21
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
BEDS
BEDS

RN

LPN

AIDE

ADMIN OTHER

1 .0 0 0 0

RN

0.6485

1 .0 0 0 0

LPN

0.8018

0.3784

1 .0 0 0 0

AIDE

0.8615

0.6937

0.7459

1 .0 0 0 0

ADMIN

0.4355

0.3297

0.3312

0.3932

1 .0 0 0 0

OTHER

0.7232

0-4072

0.7473

0.6906

0.3440

1 .0 0 0 0

There is a high positive correlation between many o f the variables in tables 20 and
21 which is evidence that multicollinearity could be a problem. The highest correlations
were between the labor variables and the number of licensed beds. That means the larger
nursing homes utilized more labor in general than the the smaller ones, as expected.
Three methods for separating the effects of size from changes in the labor inputs on the
number of patient days were attempted: factorization, fixed effects and size quartiles.
Factorization was discarded immediately because it virtually eliminated any
variance in the dependent variable. It involved factoring the number of licensed beds out
of the production fimction by dividing both sides o f the equation by BEDS. The nursing
homes in Montana generally operate near capacity as seen in the summary of output in
chapter 4. The overall average number o f patient days per bed was 324.6 out of a
possible 365 and the standard error was only 40.7. The upper bound on this measure
might have caused additional problems because the distribution of the dependent variable
was not standard normal.
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The second method for separating the effect of size from input mix was to
introduce fixed effects into the model. Fixed effects is a common method used with
panel data to isolate the intra-individual effects to be analyzed. This method includes an
indicator for each individual nursing home in the data which allows parallel equations to
be estimated for each of them. Equations 41 and 42 are the linear forms of the production
functions with fixed effects.

(Equation 41)
f= l

(Equation 42)
i=l

Where Fi is an indicator for nursing home number i out of n total nursing homes.
Size was not directly controlled for with this method, but by controlling for each
nursing home it is controlling for the size o f each nursing home indirectly. One problem
with this method is that there was not much variation in the independent variables for a
single nursing home over the short period being analyzed. The results of the estimation
of equations 41 and 42 using OLS with fixed effects are in table 22.
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Table 22
Fixed Effects OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Equation 41
Variables’

Equation 42

Est. P

Std. Err.*

t

Est. p

Std. Err.*

t

InRN

0.032

0.019

1.71

-0 . 0 0 2

0.034

-0.04

InLPN

0.013

0.017

0.72

-0.028

0.043

-0.64

InALLOTHER

0.060

0.026

2.33

—

—

—

InAIDE

—

—

"

0.162

0.057

2.86

InADMIN

—

—

—

-0.027

0.023

-1.17

InOTHER

—

—

—

0.017

0.020

0.85

InBEDS

0.720

0.075

9.64

0.078

0.098

0.79

CONSTANT

5.818

0.438

13.29

8.120

0.791

10.27

N=655,n=121
R^adjusted'^.9685

N=178, n=93
R*adju5ted~0-9882, F ( 6 , 7 9 ) ~ 1 . 6 1

' The coefficients for the indicator variables for each facility were not included in this table.
^ Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.

The most obvious result in table 22 is that the independent variables in the
estimation o f equation 42 fail to explain the variation in the dependent variable. The Fstatistic of 1.61 is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level which means that there is
not a strong enough relationship between the inputs and output in that model to reject the
hypothesis that all of the coefficients are equal to zero. The F-statistic is not usually
reported because it is uncommon that a model will fail the F-test. It is not surprising in
this case because there were at most only two years of data for each nursing home. That
does not allow enough variation to explain anything with confidence. No conclusions
were drawn from this model because the model did not pass the F-test.
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The estimation of equation 41 reported in table 22 was quite a bit more successful
than the estimation of equation 42. That was probably because there were more years of
data available for each nursing home in this model. It passed the F-test and had a very
high R\djusted. Two of the four coefficients were found to be statistically significant at the
0.05 level of significance. All of the independent variables had the expected positive sign
on their coefficients.
The problem o f heteroskedasticity was still a factor after adding fixed effects to
the model according to the Cook-Weisberg test. One of the basic assumptions that makes
OLS the best linear unbiased estimator, or BLUE, is the assumption that the residuals
have a constant variance. The residuals are the difference between the observed values of
the dependent variable and the predicted values generated by the model.
Heteroskedasticity does not affect the estimated coefficients in the model, but it distorts
the standard errors which undermines the tests for statistical significance. White's
correction for heteroskedasticity generates robust standard errors that can be used to
perform valid statistical tests. As noted in table 22, White's correction was used for the
statistics in table 22 and for all of the subsequent OLS regressions.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Page 74

The third method used to separate the effects of size from input mix was to add
indicator variables to control for size ranges. Three indicators were added to the model
that indicated whether the nursing home was in the 2"^, 3"* and 4* quartile ranges of size
based on the number o f licensed beds. The size indicators divided the data into four
groups; 9-37 licensed beds, 38-60 licensed beds, 61-95 licensed beds and over 95
licensed beds. The number of licensed beds in the largest group ranged from 98 to 279.
The linear forms of the production functions with indicators for the size quartiles are as
follows:
h i( ô ) —^ 0 + ^ 1 kl (Z; ) +
4-« 2 ^

2 + ^ 3

^ 2

^ 3+^^4

In (2 2 )4 - / 3 3 In (2 ,3 ) 4 -

In (AT)

^ 4

(Equation 43)

k i ( Ô ) = ^ 0 + ^ I k i ( i 1) + 2 I n ( 1,2 ) + ^ 4 k i ( 7^4 ) + ^ 5 k i ( 7-5 )

+

(Equation 44)

The advantage of this method was that it effectively separated the impact of input
variation on output from the impact of size without over-stratifying the data like the fixed
effects model. This is the functional form for the model from which the major
conclusions were drawn. Table 23 summarizes the results from the estimation of
equations 43 and 44.
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Table 23
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Controlling for Size
Equation 43
Variables

Equation 44

Est. p

Std. E rr.'

t

Est. p

Std. Err.»

t

InRN

0.056

0.014

4.02

0.046

0.027

1.69

InLPN

0.042

0 .0 1 1

3.63

0.032

0.019

1.72

InALLOTHER

0.066

0 .0 2 2

2.97

—

—

—

InAIDE

—

—

—

0.156

0.038

4.07

InADMIN

—

—

—

-0.006

0.016

-0.40

InOTHER

—

—

—

-0.008

0.017

-0.49

InBEDS

0.959

0.035

27.22

0.970

0.056

17.29

SI2E2

-0.029

0.024

-1 . 2 0

-0.130

0.043

-2.96

SIZE3

-0.081

0.034

-2.36

-0.194

0.060

-3.24

SIZE4

-0.168

0.044

-3.86

-0.333

0.077

-4.31

CONSTANT

4.348

0.256

17.01

3.762

0.299

12.60

N=655, R"adjusted=0.9498

N=178, R^djuated=0.9552

‘ Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.

Including these controls for the size of the nursing homes improved the
relationship between the input variables and the output variable. Over 95% of the
variation in the natural log of patient days for 1992 to 1998 was explained by the
variables in equation 43 according to the Readjusted. Over 98% of the variation in the
natural log of patient days for 1997 to 1998 was explained by the variables in equation 44
according to the Readjusted- The t-statistics increased for both RN's and LPbTs in table 23
compared to table 19 with no controls. The t-statistics indicate that the coefficients for
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SIZES and SIZE4 were statistically significantly different fi-om zero at the 0.05 level of
significance in the estimation of equation 43 and all three size indicators were statistically
significant in the estimation o f equation 44.
The fact that the coefficients of the size indicators were increasingly negative does
not mean that larger nursing homes produced less output. There was a parallel shift
downward in the linear form of the production function for nursing homes in larger size
groups, but the level o f output was higher on average than nursing homes in the smaller
size group. The slope o f the function and the relationship between inputs and output
remained intact for nursing homes of all sizes.
This model was previously estimated including interactions between the size
indicators and each of the input variables. Ramses regression specification error test
(RESET) revealed that the model was mis-specified or had missing variables when the
interactions were included. That was not the case when the interactions were excluded
fi-om the model as reported in table 23. The RESET test involves regressing the
dependent variable, Idays, against the powers of the fitted values and the other
independent variables in the model and testing for statistical significance in the
coefficients o f the added variables. The hypothesis that the model is correctly specified,
or has no omitted variables, is rejected if the coefficients of the powers of the fitted
values are found to have a statistically significant impact on the model.
Section 3: Controlling for Quality
It was established earlier in this analysis, and should be reiterated, that every
method for measuring quality o f care is subject to scrutiny because of the subjective
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nature o f the measurement. Average price per patient day was chosen as a proxy for
quality in this analysis for two main reasons. The first reason was that it was easily
calculated fi-om information included in the DPHHS survey and the second was that it is
not directly related to any of the other independent variables included in the regression.
Price also reflects more o f the intangible properties of quality than the index measures
suggested by Holmberg and Anderson and Levey, et al. They used input oriented
measures that compared amounts of resources devoted to each patient. That method does
not take into account factors such as location and scenery which might be important to
nursing homes in Montana. Price reflects a willingness to pay for the complete package
offered by each nursing home, taking into account all of the alternatives and their prices.
Using price as a proxy measure for quality defers to the patients and their families the
decision o f which items in the packages offered by nursing homes are determinants of
quality.
Adding price to equations 43 and 44 results in equations 45 and 46:

(Equation 45)
ln(0)=^o+^i ln(L,)-b^2ln(L2)+^,ln(Lj+^;ln(L;)
(Equation 46)
The regression results including price are in table 24.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

P age 78

Table 24
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Controlling for Size and Average Price
r-

... ■

-

Equation 45

Equation 46

E st p

Std. E rr.'

t

Est. P

Std. E rr.'

t

InRN

0.055

0.014

3.93

0.046

0.028

1.62

InLPN

0.040

0.011

3.57

0.035

0.020

1.72

InALLOTHER

0.059

0.023

2.63

—

—

0.143

0.049

2.89

Variables

InAIDE

—

—

—

InADMIN

—

—

—

-0.006

0.017

-0.33

InOTHER

—

—

—

-0.010

0.013

-0.76

InBEDS

0.962

0.035

27.50

0.974

0.062

15.72

SIZE2

-0.026

0.024

-1.11

-0.119

0.034

-3.46

SIZES

-0.070

0.034

-2.05

-0.175

0.049

-3.58

SIZE4

-0.161

0.043

-3.71

-0.321

0.067

-4.80

PRICE

-0.000

0.000

-0.76

0.000

0.000

1.49

1

CONSTANT

4.437

0.259

17.13

3.856

0.436

8.85

!

N=650, R'adj«s.cd=0.9508

N=177, RWd=0.9560
--------- ------------— ----- -— —
---------- 1

Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.

Price was not statistically significant nor practically significant in the estimation
of either equation. Comparing the results in table 23 to those in table 24 reveals that
including price in the regression had a negligible effect on the estimated coefficients and
the standard errors of the other independent variables. The price variable, and
consequently the quality o f care, was excluded from the remaining analyses because of
the complete lack of significance in the production function.
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Section 4: Controlling for Ownership Type
The first of two policy related questions this paper sought to answer was: what
effect does ownership type have on the efficiency of output in nursing homes. Binary
indicator variables for non-profit and government nursing homes were included
individually to reflect parallel shifts in their production functions relative to that of forprofit nursing homes. The product of these indicators and each of the input variables
were included to reflect changes in the slope o f their production functions relative to forprofit nursing homes. The linear form of the equations that were estimated including
these indicators are:

l n ( Z ^ ) - l - I n {L^+5^D2 In (Z/j)
+

In { / : ) + 5 j5 Z), In {z:)-h

In (a:)

(Equation 47)
In (0 ) = j S o + I n ( i , ) +

^ 3

Z), In {Z,, ) +

Z> 2 In (Z,, )

^ 4

+ ^ 2 In (Z,2 )+5sZ>, In [L )+ ^D In {L^)
+ ^ 4 In (^ 4 )+ dçZ), In (7 ,4 )-!-d,oZ) 2 In {Z4 )
-P/$;ln(Z:3 )-P6 nZ)iln(Z,;)+ 6 ,2 D 2 ln(Z:;)
+ ^6ln(Zj+5,3Z)iln(l6)+5,4Z)2ln(Z:J
+ ^ 2 ln(Z :)+ ô, 3 D ,ln (Æ )+ d „ D 2 ln(Zr)
2

6

2

-HOtj ^2 + «3 5 3 -H«4i?4 + 5, Z) J+ ^2 Z>2

(Equation 48)

The regression results o f the estimation of equations 47 and 48 are in table 25.
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Table 25
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Controlling for Size and Ownership Type
Equation 47

Equation 48

Est. P

Std. Err.*

t

Est. p

Std. E rr.'

t

InRN

0.021

0.031

0.70

0.067

0.058

1.16

lnRN*NP

-0.003

0.035

-0.09

-0.082

0.071

-1.16

lnRN*GOV

0.098

0.060

1.62

-0.020

0.085

-0.24

InLPN

0.047

0.023

2.05

0.060

0.033

1.85

lnLPN*NP

-0.006

0.028

-0.21

-0.043

0.043

-1.00

lnLPN*GOV

-0.095

0.034

-2.76

-0.125

0.048

-2.63

InALLOTHER

0.269

0.057

4.68

—

—

-

lnALLOTHER*NP

-0.265

0.063

-4.24

—

—

—

lnALLOTHER*GOV

-0.289

0.064

-4.48

—

—

-

InAIDE

—

—

—

0.192

0.072

2.67

lnAIDE*NP

—

—

—

-0.099

0.092

-1.07

lnAlDE*GOV

—

—

—

-0.131

0.099

-1.33

InADMIN

—

—

—

-0.034

0.031

-1.10

lnADMIN*NP

—

—

—

0.060

0.041

1.48

lnADMIN*GOV

—

—

0.035

0.047

0.76

—

—

0.105

0.051

2.06

Variables^

InOTHER
lnOTHER*NP

—

—

—

-0.122

0.054

-2.24

InOTHER*GOV

—

—

—

-0.102

0.063

-1.62

InBEDS

0.724

0.059

12.29

0.659

0.105

6.29

lnBEDS*NP

0.313

0.068

4.63

0.407

0.120

3.40

InBEDS*GOV

0.361

0.069

5.23

0.458

0.149

3.07

NP

1.853

0.481

3.85

1.308

0.803

1.63

GOV

1.767

0.587

3.01

1.635

0.864

1.89

SIZE2

-0.022

0.031

-0.72

-0.128

0.038

-3.35

SIZES

-0.051

0.035

-1.43

-0.130

0.057

-2.29

SIZE4

-0.103

0.045

-2.30

-0.228

0.073

-3.15
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Table 25
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Controlling for Size and Ownership Type
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1
C O N S T A N T

3 .2 5 1

0 .4 1 9

7 .7 6

N = 6 5 5 , R ^ a d ju s i« i= 0 .9 5 5 3

3 .2 1 9

0 .5 6 1

5 .7 4

N = 1 7 8 , R ^ ju jju s ie < r ^ .9 6 0 2

' Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.
^Government and Non-profit nursing homes were separated in 1997 and 1998 according to their
ownership type in 1996.

The specification of this model was valid and did not have an omitted-variables
problem according to Ramses RESET test. The R%(^usw for both regressions was over
0.95 which means that over 95% of the variation in InDAYS was attributable to variation
in the dependent variables. The main effects of the government and non-profit indicator
variables were statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the estimation of equation 47,
but not in the estimation o f equation 48. Conversely, the coefficients on the indicator
variables for nursing homes of larger size were all statistically significant in the
estimation of equation 48, but only the indicator for the largest nursing homes was
statistically significant in the estimation of equation 47.
For each interaction variable in table 25 there were two statistical tests to perform
to determine the relationship between the input variable and output. The first was a
standard t-test using the t-statistics reported in table 25 to determine whether or not the
estimated coefficient for the interacted variable was statistically significantly different
from zero. Statistically significant coefficients on the interacted variables indicate that
the relationship of the input variable and output was different for the indicated ownership
type than the relationship in for-profit nursing homes. For-profit nursing homes are the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Page 82

base case in this model because they are the only ownership type not represented by an
indicator variable.
The second statistical test used to evaluate the impact of the input variable on the
model was a t-test on the transformed coefficients. The coefficients on the non-interacted
input variables measure the relationship between the input variable and output at forprofit nursing homes. The coefficients on the interaction variables measure the difference
between the coefficients for for-profit facilities and for the ownership type indicated by
the indicator variable. The total effect of the input variable on output for a given
ownership type is the combination of the coefficient for the non-interacted variable and
the interacted variable for that ownership type. Tables 26 and 27 summarize the
transformed coefficients for the input variables jfrom the estimation of equations 47 and
48.

Table 26
Coefficients Transformed by Ownership Type for Equation 47
Government

For-Profit
Variable

Est. P

Non-Profit

t

Est. P+Ô

t

Est. P+Ô

t

InRN

0 .0 2 1

0.70

0.119

2.24

0.018

1.28

InLPN

0.047

2.05

-0.048

-2 . 0 0

0.041

2.74

InALLOTH

0.269

4.68

-0 . 0 2 0

-0 . 6 6

0.004

0.15

InBEDS

0.724

12.29

1.085

27.19

1.037

25.09

CONSTANT

3.251

7.76

5.018

12.51

5.104

18.77

The relationship between RN labor and output was not found to be statistically
significant at the 0.05 level for non-profit or for-profit nursing homes in the estimation of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

P a g e 83

equation 47. It was significant and positive for government nursing homes. LPN labor
was found to have a statistically significant relationship with output for all three types of
ownership. The coefficient on InLPN was negative for government nursing homes which
means lower output is associated with more LPN labor hours. That fact had a dramatic
effect on the evaluation of efficiency at government owned nursing homes. The
coefficient was positive and statistically significant for InALLOTHER for for-profit
nursing homes, but it was not significant for the other two ownership types. The
relationship between InBEDS and output was positive and statistically significant for all
three ownership types.

Table 27
Coefficients Transformed by Ownership Type for Equation 48
Government

For-Profit

Non-Profit

Est. p

t

Est. P+Ô

t

Est. P+Ô

t

InRN

0.067

1.16

0.047

0.79

-0.015

-0.41

InLPN

0.060

1.85

-0.065

-1.80

0.018

0.61

InAIDES

0.192

2.67

0.062

0.90

0.093

1.29

InADMIN

-0.034

-1,10

0.001

0.04

0.026

1.07

InOTHER

0.105

2.06

0.004

0.10

-0.016

-0.89

InBEDS

0.659

6.29

1.117

10.13

1.066

13.41

CONSTANT

3.219

5.74

4.854

7.10

4.527

7.63

Variable
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Few o f the relationships between the input variables and output were found to be
statistically significant in the estimation of equation 48. Aside from licensed beds, no
other inputs had statistically significant effects on output for government and non-profit
nursing homes. Aides, other labor and licensed beds were the only inputs that had
statistically significant coefficients for for-profit nursing homes.
Section 5: Efficiency
The estimated coefficients from the OLS regressions using equations 43, 44,47
and 48 were substituted for the parameters in the exponential forms of the production
functions, equations 3, 4, 14, and 15, respectively, from chapter 3. A zero was entered for
the coefficients that were statistically not significantly different from zero at the 0.05
level of significance. The marginal products were calculated at the means for each input
as described by equations 16-35 in chapter 3. The marginal products are summarized in
tables 28 and 30.
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Table 28
Marginal Products from the Estimation of Equations
43 and 47 Calculated at the Means

Input
RN

LPN

ALLOTHER

BEDS

Licensed
Beds

Overall

9-37

0.0035

—

38-60

0.0053

—

61-95

0.0054

—

—

0.0078

Over 95

0.0070

—

—

0.0127

9-37

0.0029

0.0061

0 .0 0 1 2

-0.0042

38-60

0.0048

0 .0 1 0 0

0.0024

-0.0043

61-95

0.0055

0.0108

0.0024

-0.0057

Over 95

0.0046

0.0087

0.0023

-0.0040

9-37

0.0008

0.0060

—

—

38-60

0.0008

0.0060

—

—

61-95

0 .0 0 1 0

0.0067

—

Over 95

0 .0 0 1 0

0.0066

—

For-Profit

Non-Profit
—

Government
0.0039
0.0067

—

9-37

17.71

25.05

8.62

14.78

38-60

18.27

25.22

8.78

14.78

61-95

18.80

24.50

9.16

16.35

Over 95

19.64

24.73

9.36

16.81

The first item o f particular note in table 28 is the dramatic difference in the
marginal product of licensed beds between the different ownership types. Adding the last
bed to a for-profit nursing home increased output by around 25 patient days while adding
the last bed to a non-profit nursing home only increased output by around 9 patient days.
The last bed at a government nursing home increased output by around 15 patient days.
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For-profit nursing homes also had a higher marginal product of LPN labor than
the other two ownership types. The negative values for the marginal product of LPN
labor for government nursing homes indicates that the last unit of labor actually decreased
output for those facilities. The inefficiency regarding the utilization of LPN's at
government facilities is obvious even without considering the wage rate.
At this point it became difficult to proceed with an analysis of efficiency for the
input variables in these equations because so many of them were not statistically
significant and also because wage estimates were only available for two of the variables
in table 28, RN labor and LPN labor. The three cases with enough information to
calculate relative efficiency ratios were the overall production function without controls
for ownership type, the government owned nursing homes in the production function with
controls for ownership type and the non-government nursing homes in the same
production function. The relative efficiency ratios were calculated for RN labor and LPN
labor for those three cases and the results are summarized in table 29.

Table 29
Relative Efficiency Ratios (xlOOO)
Overall

Government

Non-Government

Licensed Beds

RN

LPN

RN

LPN

RN

LPN

9-37

0.1988

0.2592

0.2215

-0.3753

0.1678

0.3624

38-60

0.3010

0.4290

0.3805

-0.3843

0.2545

0.6039

61-95

0.3066

0.4915

0.4429

-0.5094

0.2578

0.6869

Over 95

0.3975

0.4111

0.7212

-0.3575

0.3354

0.5742

The wage would have had to have been negative for the utilization rate of LPN's
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at government nursing homes to be efficient. The marginal product per dollar spent on
LPN labor was negative for government owned nursing homes. The differences between
the relative efficiency ratios for RN's and LPN's at government nursing homes of all sizes
indicate that they could increase output without increasing their payroll by increasing the
use o f RN's and decreasing the use of LPN's. The largest difference was for the largest
nursing homes where the last dollar spent on RN's produced 0.0007212 patient days and
the last dollar spent on LPN's reduced output by 0.0003575 patient days. That represents
a difference o f 1.0787 patient days per thousand dollars. The smallest difference was
0.5968 patient days per thousand dollars for the government nursing homes in the group
with the least number o f beds.
The direction o f the inefficiency was reversed for the non-govemment nursing
homes. For-profit and non-profit nursing homes over-utilized RN labor compared to
LPN labor. The smallest difference was for the smallest nursing homes. The difference
in the relative efficiency ratios for the smallest nursing homes in this group was 0.1964
patient days per thousand dollars. The largest difference was 0.4291 patient days per
thousand dollars for nursing homes in the 61-95 bed size group.
The nursing home industiy as a whole did not display the same inefficiency as the
government and non-govemment owned segments with regard to the mix of RN's and
LPN's. The marginal product per dollar spent was nearly equal for the largest nursing
homes. In general, the marginal product per dollar spent was higher for LPN's than for
RN's indicating a slight overutilization of RN's. The largest difference between the
marginal product per dollar spent on RN's and LPN's was for nursing homes with
between 61 and 95 licensed beds. For this group the last dollar spent on LPN labor
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produced 0.0004915 patient days and the last dollar spent on RN labor only produced
0.0003066 patient days of output.

Table 30
Marginal Products from the Estimation of Equations
44 and 48 Calculated at the Means

Input'

Licensed
Beds

Overall

For-Profit

Non-Profit

Government

9-37

0.0030

0.0049

—

—

38-60

0.0029

0.0043

61-95

0.0032

0.0044

—

—

Over 95

0.0040

0.0050

—

—

9-37

—

0.0018

—

—

38-60

—

0.0017

—

—

61-95

—

0.0019

—

—

—

0.0016

—

—

AIDE

OTHER

Over 95

—

9-37

15.85

14.32

4.26

5.32

38-60

16.70

13.70

4.26

5.36

61-95

17.29

12.96

4.41

5.76

Over 95

17.13

11.81

4.42

”

BEDS

' AIDES, OTHER and BEDS were the only inputs with statistically significant values in the estimation of
equations 44 and 48.

Table 30 does not reveal a great deal about the utilization of inputs because so
many of the input variables were not statistically significant. The two most interesting
facts are the importance o f aides in the production of patient care and the difference
between the marginal products o f beds at for-profit nursing homes compared to the other
ownership types.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

P age 89

The Strong relationship between aides and patient days overshadowed the effects
of other types o f labor in the data which allowed them to be counted separately. It is
unfortunate that it was not possible to evaluate the efficiency of the utilization of aides in
the current analysis due to the constraints of the data.
It is important to reiterate that in the time period used for the estimation of
equations 44 and 48, 1997-1998, the original data did not differentiate between
government and non-profit nursing homes. This may help explain the similarities in the
marginal products of licensed beds for the two groups. The marginal product of licensed
beds was again much higher that the other two ownership types. That would imply that
for-profit nursing homes operate under a different set of constraints and should be
evaluated individually and compared to the other two ownership types combined.
Section 6; Effect of For-Profit Ownership on Output
The linear form of the production functions including the main effects of the forprofit indicator variable are

+a2B2+ci^B^+oi4B4+0^jDj

(Equation 49)

ln (g )= ^ o + ^ ,ln (Z ,)+ ^ 2 ln (l2 )+ ^ ,ln (IJ + ^ 3 ln (Z ;)
+ ^ 6

In (/, 6

) + ^ 7

In (à:)+ « 2

«3 ^ 3 +

« 4

^ 4 + ^ i7 ^ 3

(Equation 50)

The results of the estimation o f equations 49 and 50 are summarized in table 31.
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Table 31
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Controlling for Size and For-Profit
Equation 49
Variables

Equation 50

Est. p

Std. Err.*

t

Est. p

Std. Err.*

t

FP

-0.055

0.016

-3.46

-0.040

0.027

-1.51

InRN

0.043

0.014

3.07

0.039

0.029

1.38

InLPN

0.042

0 .0 1 1

3.75

0.033

0 .0 2 0

1 .6 6

InALLOTHER

0.068

0 .0 2 2

3.11

—

—

““

—

—

0.145

0.048

3.03

—

--

-0 . 0 0 1

0.016

-0.07

—

—

—

-0.004

0.013

-0.30

InBEDS

0.970

0.035

27.86

0.977

0.062

15.81

SIZE2

-0.030

0.024

-1.24

-0.123

0.034

-3.60

SIZES

-0.069

0.034

-2.04

-0.179

0.048

-3.74

SIZE4

-0.142

0.043

-3.27

-0 . 0 0 0

0.067

-4.56

CONSTANT

4.415

0.242

18.22

3.810

0.422

9.02

InAIDE

—

InADMIN
InOTHER

N=655, R\dju.wd=0.9509
* . .

« l u ju a i s u

w

. —

—

N=178, R^djusted=0.9556
-

-

7

“ “ j*

Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.
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The for-profit indicator was not statistically significant in the estimation of
equation 50. That means that the data for those years did not produce strong enough
evidence to indicate that there is a difference between the production function of forprofit nursing homes and other ownership types. It was once again clear that the number
of aides and the number o f beds are the key factors in determining output for nursing
homes. The Readjusted indicates that over 95% of the variation in the dependent variables
was explained by the independent variables for each model.
The estimation of equation 49 including data for the entire time period and
including aides as and administrators as part of "other" labor produced a negative and
statistically significant coefficient on the for-profit indicator. According to this model,
for-profit nursing homes produced (l-e'° °^^), or 5.35%, less output than government and
non-profit nursing homes of the same size with the same input levels. These results are
consistent with table 7 in chapter 4 which showed that for-profit nursing homes produced
less output per licensed bed. For-profit nursing homes produced 7.35% more output
during the period, but they were larger on average than the other nursing homes and had
13.73% more licensed beds overall.
Section 7: Effect of Chain Ownership on O utput
The main effect of chain management on output was evaluated in this section
using the same method as the evaluation of for-profit ownership in the previous section.
The basic production functions including an indicator for chain management are
k ( e ) = g o + f,ln (4 ) + f 2 k ( 4 )+ f3 ln (4 ) + f 7 k ( A :)
(Equation 51)
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(Equatioii 52)
The results from the estimation of equations 51 and 52 are summarized in table 32.

Table 32
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Controlling for Size and Chain
Equation 51
Variables

Equation 52

Est. P

Std. Err.*

t

Est. p

Std. Err.*

t

CH

-0.042

0.016

-2.65

-0.053

0.024

-2.19

InRN

0.059

0.018

3.23

0.031

0.029

1.09

InLPN

0.048

0.013

3.63

0.025

0.020

1.28

InALLOTHER

0.067

0.023

2.94

—

—

—

InAIDE

—

—

—

0.159

0.048

3.33

InADMIN

—

—

"■*

-0.002

0.016

-0.15

InOTHER

—

—

—

-0.002

0.014

-0.12

InBEDS

0.959

0.043

22.18

0.978

0.061

16.00

SIZE2

-0.037

0.030

-1.21

-0.125

0.035

-3.63

SIZE3

-0.080

0.043

-1.88

-0.184

0.049

-3.77

SIZE4

-0.173

-0.000

-3.23

-0.309

0.066

-4.68

CONSTANT

4.256

0.278

15.30

3.800

0.414

9.17

N=470, R"adjustecT^O.9504

N=178, R'adjusted=0.9561

* Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.

The coefficient on the chain indicator was negative and statistically sigmficant in
the estimation of both equations in table 32. The coefficient o f -0.042 from the
estimation o f equation 51 implies that chain managed nursing homes produced 4.1% less
output than the alternatives in 1994 to 1998. The coefficient o f -0.053 from the
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estimation of equation 52 implies that chain managed nursing homes produced 5.2% less
output than the alternatives in 1997 and 1998,
The last estimation o f the production function in this analysis included the main
effects of both the chain indicator and the for-profit indicator. The linear form of the
production function including these indicators are

-l-a2 i? 2 + « 3 ^ 3 + ^ 4 ^ 4 + ^ i 7 ^ 3 “''^ ig ^
bi( 0 )=^o'*'^i In (%.,)+ ^ 2 In (7 ,2 ) 4 -

In

(Equation 53)
^ 5

In ( I 5 )

+ ^^ln(Z,6 )-l-^7 ln(Â')-+-«2 i?2 + ^ 3 '®3 + « 4 -®4 + ^ i 7 -^ 3 + ^ i 8 C

(Equation 54)

Output was compared for four groups using equations 53 and 54. The groups were forprofit chain, for-profit independent, not-for-profit chain and not-for-profit independent
nursing homes. The base case for comparison was not-for-profit independent nursing
homes.
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Table 33
OLS Estimation Results for the Production Function
Controlling for Size, For-Profit and Chain
Equation 53
Variables

Equation 54

Est. p

Std. E rr.’

t

Est. P

Std. E rr.’

t

FP

-0.024

0.018

-1.32

-0.013

0.031

-0.40

CH

-0.028

0.018

-1.61

-0.046

0.029

-1.61

InRN

0.057

0.018

3.12

0.031

0.029

1.08

InLPN

0.050

0.013

3.74

0.026

0 .0 2 0

1.30

InALLOTHER

0.066

0.023

2.92

—

—

—

—

0.155

0.049

3.20

InAIDE

—

InADMIN

—

—

”

-0 . 0 0 1

0.016

-0.08

InOTHER

—

—

—

-0 . 0 0 1

0.014

-0.08

InBEDS

0.959

0.043

22.16

0.979

0.062

15.92

SIZE2

-0.036

0.030

-1 . 2 0

-0.124

0.034

-3.62

SIZE3

-0.076

0.042

-1.81

-0.181

0.048

-3.76

SIZE4

-0.163

0.053

-3.08

-0.304

0.066

-4.59

CONSTANT

4.275

0.275

15.56

3.810

0.414

9.19

N=470, R'adiusted=0.9505

N=178, R^djusted=0.9559

’ Standard errors were corrected using Whites correction for Heteroskedasticity.

Neither indicator was statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance
which means that output levels at for-profit independent nursing homes and not-for-profit
chain nursing homes was not significantly different from that of not-for-profit
independent nursing homes. The sum o f the coefficients for the two indicators was
negative and statistically significant in both estimations. The sum o f the coefficients in
the estimation o f equation 53 was -0.052 which means that for-profit chain nursing homes
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produced 5.08% less output than the others over the period 1994-1998. The sum of the
coefficients in the estimation of equation 54 was -0.059 which means that for-profit chain
nursing homes produced 5.73% less output in 1997-1998.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
Section 1 : Summary of Findings
The findings of this paper were based on the observed relationships between
production inputs and output as described by the model using the available data on the
nursing home industry in Montana. The model was based on a combination of basic
economic theory, results fi-om published studies and observation of the data. The data on
nursing home operations was collected and made available by the Montana Department of
Public Health and Human Services. This analysis also utilized population and wage
estimates from the U. S. Census Bureau and the U. S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics.
The results presented in chapter 5 revealed three major conclusions regarding the
effect o f ownership type and chain membership on nursing home output. The first major
conclusion was that government operated nursing homes employed LPN's at inefficiently
high levels. The impact of the over employment of LPN's was small, but statistically
significant. The second major conclusion was that RN's were over-employed at for-profit
and non-profit nursing homes. Again the impact was small, but statistically significant.
The third major conclusion was that for-profit and chain nursing homes produced fewer
patient days with the same employment levels of inputs. The difference in output levels
between the for-profit, chain nursing homes and all others was substantial enough to draw
some attention.
The nursing home industry did not appear to operating inefficiently with regard to
RN and LPN labor when taken as a whole only because the inefficiency of the individual
segments canceled each other out. Government nursing homes were over utilizing LPN's
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with respect to RN's and the opposite was true for the other ownership types. The
production function had to be estimated with the effect of different ownership types
included to observe the inefficiencies that existed.
Based on the results of this analysis, government operated nursing homes could
have increased output by decreasing the employment of LPN's for the full study period,
1992-1998. The lost output due to the over employment of LPN's ranged fi-om a little
over

1

patient day per thousand dollars for the largest nursing homes to about % patient

days per thousand dollars for the smallest nursing homes.
In contrast to the state operated nursing homes, the privately owned nursing
homes showed evidence of over utilization of RN's during the same period. The
magnitude o f the lost output at for-profit and non-profit nursing homes was less than V%
patient day per thousand dollars.
For-profit nursing homes produced more total patient days of nursing home care
than non-profit and government operated nursing homes in Montana for 6 out of the
seven years in study period according to the summary o f data in chapter 4. 30-40% of the
total patient days provided in each o f the years came fi-om chain nursing homes. The forprofit and chain nursing homes have been increasing their market share over the study
period according to the number of nursing homes as described in table 3, and also
according to the number o f patient days produced as described in section 3 of chapter 4.
The results in chapter 5 revealed that when given the same employment levels of
inputs, for-profit nursing homes produced 5.35% less output than nursing homes of other
types over the period fiom 1992-1998. Chain nursing homes produced 4.1% less output
than non-chain nursing homes with the same input levels over the period fiom 1994-
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1998, and 5.2% less output than non-chain nursing homes with the same input levels
during the period from 1997-1998. For-profit, chain nursing homes produced 5.08% less
output during the 1992-1998 period and 5.73% less output during the 1997-1998 period
than other nursing homes with the same inputs.
Section 2: Policy Implications
The policy issue this analysis sought to address was the increase in demand for
nursing home care and the ability of the industry to adjust the supply in order to produce
enough care for all those in the state for whom it is required. The quality and price of
nursing home care are related issues that this paper was unable to address with the
specified model. The inefficiencies in labor input utilization discovered in this analysis
do not seem significant enough in a practical sense to warrant a policy change regarding
the employment of different types of labor at nursing homes in Montana. It was clear that
inefficiencies existed, but at a level too small to have an impact on these issues.
The difference in output levels at for-profit and chain nursing homes raises some
concerns regarding the supply of nursing home care in Montana. Total nursing home
output may decrease as these types o f nursing homes increase their market share. Forprofit and chain nursing homes were found to produce less output given the same inputs,
but they were larger nursing homes on average. That means the largest potential
producers of nursing home care were not producing as close to capacity as the other types
of nursing homes. That leaves room for demand to increase in the short run if the
restriction o f output was not intentional. If output was restricted intentionally to
maximize profits, then they would choose not to increase the production of nursing home
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care without an increase in prices.
Section 3: Further Study
Two related topics that arose during the production o f this paper were the demand
for nursing home care and the quality o f care. Both were discussed as they related to the
purpose o f this study and had more data been available at the time o f this study, those
discussion could have been expanded.
This paper asserts that there has been and will continue to be a increase in demand
for nursing home care. The assertion was based on observed changes in the
demographics o f the population in the state and their relevance to factors determined by
other researchers to affect the demand for nursing home care. The previous research on
demand for nursing home care is fairly old and may not take into account the increase in
the number and types o f alternatives to nursing homes in recent years. A quantitative
analysis o f demand was not deemed necessary for this study, but it could be used to
determine the relevance and urgency o f the current topic.
The summary o f the data in chapter 4 indicated that there has not been an increase
in the quantity o f nursing home care demanded over the period 1992 to 1998, based on
the changes in the total number o f patient days per year shown in table 4. There was a
dramatic increase o f 70,422 patient days (193 full-year patients) from 1992 to 1993 and
then a steady decline from 1993 to 1998. The nursing home industry in Montana
produced fewer patient days in 1998 than in 1992. The decrease was 27,603 patient days,
or approximately 75 fiill-year patients.
The 33% increase in prices from 1992 to 1998 may explain the decrease in the
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quantity demanded. Chiswick and Lamberton, et al. estimated the own price elasticity of
nursing home care to be -2,3 and -0.76, respectively. A rough interpretation o f these
estimated elasticities would imply that the 33% increase in prices would have led to a
75.9% decrease in quantity demanded using Chiswick's estimate and a 25.1% decrease
using Lamberton, et al.'s estimate if nothing changed other than the price. The actual
decrease was only 1.3%.
The use o f price as a proxy for the quality o f care was rudimentary, but functional.
Measurement o f the quality o f care requires a diverse set o f variables that were not
available at the time o f this study. Information on nutrition, health conditions,
socioeconomic status o f the patients, employee turnover rates, participation rates in
physical therapy programs and the availability o f social programs and activities are
examples o f the data required for a more complete picture o f the quality o f care.
Frequently used components o f quality measures that were available were labor hours and
expenses per patient day or per bed at each facility.
This analysis has presented evidence that inefficiencies exist in the nursing home
industry in Montana, but not at critical levels. The inefficiencies were related to the type
o f ownership o f the nursing homes. It has also shown that ownership type and
involvement with a chain affects output levels. For-profit and chain nursing homes
produced lower levels o f output than nursing homes o f other types with the same
employment levels o f inputs.
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